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TERRITORY, WILDERNESS, PROPERTY, AND
RESERVATION: LAND AND RELIGION IN NATIVE
AMERICAN SUPREME COURT CASES
Kathleen Sands*
Abstract
In two trilogies of Supreme Court decisions, both involving Native
Americans, land is a key metaphor, figuring variously as property, territory,
wilderness, and reservation. The first trilogy, written by Chief Justice John
Marshall, comprises Johnson v. M'Intosh (1823), Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia (1831), and Worcester v. Georgia (1832). The second trilogy
concerns Native American claims for religious freedom under the First
Amendment and includes Bowen v. Roy (1986), Lyng v. Northwest
Cemetery Protective Association (1988), and Employment Division of
Oregon v. Smith (1990).
The Marshall cases attempted to legitimate the transformation of land
from wilderness to territory and property, and in this sense, they appeared
"secular." These cases also were "religious" in an important sense: they
created a myth of origins that determined the polity's relation to the land
and people on which it was built. Of the religious freedom cases, only one
was directly concerned with land, but all three were profoundly shaped by
the Marshall trilogy and by judicial reasoning that linked land and religion.
As these cases show, judicial events at the intersection of land and religion
have been calamitous and, for Native Americans, full of violence and loss.
Grounds for hope remain in one meaning of land - the "reservation" -
deployed by Marshall in Worcester v. Georgia and artfully analyzed by
Philip Frickey in 1993. Revivifying the concept of "reservation" promises
constructive re-imaginations of both First Nations and religious freedom as
unique, foundational political categories.
* Kathleen Sands is an Associate Professor of American Studies at the University of
Hawai'i at Manoa. She would like to thank Jonathan Goldberg-Hiller, Aviam Soifer, Charles
Lawrence III, Linda Hamilton Krieger, Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, and Tisa Wenger for
their insightful responses to earlier drafts of this article.
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I wonder if the ground has anything to say? I wonder if the
ground is listening to what is said? I wonder if the ground
would come alive and what is on it?
- We-ah Te-na-tee-many, 1855'
Introduction
Might land have something to say to and. about America? Something
about roots and foundations, possession and conquest, memory and hope?
This article will explore two trilogies of Supreme Court cases, both
involving Native Americans, in which land is a telling metaphor. The first
cases occurred between 1823 and 1832 as decisions written by Chief Justice
John Marshall.2 The Rehnquist Court decided the second set of cases
between 1986 and 1990, concerning Native American claims for religious
freedom under the First Amendment. In these six cases, land appears
variously as property, territory, wilderness, and reservation. The Marshall
trilogy attempted to delineate and legitimate the foundations of political
sovereignty.4 These cases prescribed the manner in which land could be
1. Document: Indian Council in the Valley of the Walla Walla, Lawrence Kip, 1855,
CTR. FOR COLUMBIA RIVER HISTORY, http://www.ccrh.org/comm/river/treaties/kipp.htm (last
visited Sept. 10, 2012).
2. See generally Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515
(1832).
3. See generally Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986); Lyng v. Nw. Cemetery
Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988); Emp't Div. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
While, technically, Bowen v. Roy was decided at the tail end of the Burger Court era, it was
Justice Burger's presence alone that effected the distinction.
4. See George Jackson III, Chickasaw Nation v. United States and the Potential
Demise of the Indian Canon of Construction, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 399, 403 (2002-2003);
Taiawagi Helton, Introduction to the IACHR Report on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples'
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transformed from wilderness to territory and property.5  Because the
Marshall cases were concerned with foundations, they were also "religious"
in an important sense: they created a myth of origins that determined the
polity's relation to the land and people on which it was built. Of the
religious freedom cases, only one was directly concerned with land.6 But
all three were profoundly shaped by the Marshall trilogy and were shaped
by judicial reasoning that linked land and religion. Looking backward,
these cases tell us how land and religion were welded together in
constitutional history. Looking forward, they recommend the metaphor of
"reservation" as a promising way to reconceive both Native American
sovereignty and the religion clauses.
Both religion and Native Americans hold unique status within the United
States Constitution. Although religion is perilously hard to define, it does
occupy a textual place of pride in the Constitution, where it is listed as the
first item in the Bill of Rights. However it may be defined, "religion" and
only "religion" is afforded the unique privilege of free exercise, and
"religion" alone constrains government to eschew establishment.7 Indian
tribes, too, are unique in the Constitution, singled out for mention as
"Indians not taxed."8 Native Americans are politically unique through a
confluence of other factors as well, one of which is constitutional: in Article
VI, treaties are said to become the "supreme law of the land."9 Add to this
the historical fact that the federal government made numerous treaties with
Native peopleso and the principle that treaties can be made only among
sovereigns," and the result is a singular status. Native American tribes are
Rights over Their Ancestral Lands and Natural Resources: Norms and Jurisprudence of the
Inter-American Human Rights System, 35 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 257, 257-58 n.4 (2010-2011).
5. See, e.g., Katheleen R. Guzman, Give or Take an Acre: Property Norms and the
Indian Land Consolidation Act, 85 IOWA L. REV. 595, 603 (2000) ("Johnson held that, via
the British Crown, discovery conferred fee title, and, thus, transferability, upon the United
States, subject only to tribal rights of use and occupancy which were extinguishable by
federal conquest or purchase.").
6. See generally Lyng, 485 U.S. 439.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
8. Id. art. I, § 2; id. amend. 14, § 2.
9. Id. art. VI.
10. Kristen A. Carpenter, Interpretive Sovereignty: A Research Agenda, 33 AM. INDIAN
L. REV. 111, 112 (2008-2009) (noting the "hundreds of treaties executed between the United
States and Indian nations from 1778-1871").
11. See, e.g., R. Spencer Clift, III, The Historical Development of American Indian
Tribes; Their Recent Dramatic Commercial Advancement; and a Discussion of the
Eligibility ofIndian Tribes Under the Bankruptcy Code and Related Matters, 27 AM. INDIAN
L. REv. 177, 183 (2002-2003) ("The advantage of recognizing tribal settlements as 'nations'
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effectively recognized as sovereign nations,12 relating directly to the federal
government, which is supposed to be as bound by those treaties as by the
Constitution itself. It was Chief Justice John Marshall who would define
and limit the status of Indian Nations implied by this treaty relationship. 3
In addition, Chief Justice Marshall would also define a unique trustee
relationship between the federal government and Native peoples. To the
extent that it managed Native lands and affairs, the federal government was
to do so with a view to the benefit of Native peoples.14
The Burger Court, spanning from 1969 to 1986, clung to the idea that
"religion" was a constitutionally unique category, distinct from "the
secular," and as such required special accommodation 5 and rigorous non-
establishment.'6  Under the Rehnquist Court, however, the constitutional
status of both religion and Native Americans was set on a different
trajectory - one more focused on formal equality through equal treatment
rather than on accommodations premised on the unique constitutional status
of religion or indigeneity. So, rather than evoking deferential treatment,
is clear: in the event a dispute over land or territory arises, two distinct sovereigns can enter
into treaties."); Robert A. Fairbanks, Native American Sovereignty and Treaty Rights: Are
They Historical Illusions?, 20 Am. INDIAN L. REV. 141, 147 (1995-1996) ("Native American
treaties negotiated prior to March 1871[] were of the same international character as treaties
between the United States and other foreign nation-states."); Hurst Hannum, Sovereignty
and Its Relevance to Native Americans in the Twenty-First Century, 23 AM. INDIAN L. REV.
487, 495 (1998-1999) ("[S]overeignty remains a valuable concept that Native Americans
may use to argue for retaining residual and treaty rights.").
12. See, e.g., Robert J. Miller, Exercising Cultural Self-Determination: The Makah
Indian Tribe Goes Whaling, 25 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 165, 190 (2000-200 1) ("The modern day
status of Indian tribes as sovereign governments is also largely based on the historical
practice of the United States and the European nations dealing with tribes through treaty
making."); Frank Shockey, "Invidious" American Indian Tribal Sovereignty: Morton v.
Mancari contra Adarand Contructors, Inc., v. Pena, Rice v. Cayetano, and Other Recent
Cases, 25 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 275, 288 (2000-2001) ("[T]he treaty explicitly recognized the
national character of the Cherokees, and their right to self-government.").
13. See April L. Seibert, Note, Who Defines Tribal Sovereignty? An Analysis of United
States v. Lara, 28 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 393, 394 (2003-2004).
14. See Derek C. Haskew, Federal Consultation with Indian Tribes: The Foundation of
Enlightened Policy Decisions, or Another Badge of Shame?, 24 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 21, 30-
31 (1999-2000).
15. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
16. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (adding a third
requirement - that of avoiding excessive government entanglement with religion - to the
two pre-existing requirements that government action must be secular in its primary purpose
and that it, in effect, must neither advance nor inhibit religion).
256 [Vol. 36
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol36/iss2/1
No. 2] TERRITORY, WILDERNESS, PROPERTY & RESERVATION 257
religious groups, beliefs, and motives tended to be treated "the same" as
non-religious groups, beliefs, and motives.17  Similarly, rather than being
treated as a group with a constitutionally unique status, Native Americans
were increasingly treated the same as non-native citizens.'8 Ultimately, this
trajectory would mean that Native American religious claims would be
handled more by the Fourteenth Amendment, pertaining to the rights of
citizens as such, than by constitutional provisions relating specifically to
religion or to Indian tribes.
But the connection between the judiciary's treatment of Indian Nations
and its treatment of religion is not just a parallel; it is also a series of
intersections, crossings, and crashes. The best-known crossing, of course,
is Employment Division of Oregon v. Smith, in which the loss of free
exercise exemptions for Native American peyote users was at the same time
a major, and perhaps the ultimate, diminishment of free exercise for all
citizens. But the crossings began well before Smith, and in every case, they
implicate land, whether in its literal or metaphorical sense.
Together, the story told by these two sets of cases is sad indeed, and for
Native Americans, full of violence and loss. And although judicial events
at these crossings have often been calamitous, I will suggest in conclusion
17. In a series of closely divided decisions, the Rehnquist Court (1986-2005) gradually
lowered the Sherbert and Lemon standards. In free exercise jurisprudence, the nadir was
Employment Division of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), superseded by statute as
state in Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 1651 (2011), holding that the Free Exercise Clause
does not require religious exemptions to facially neutral laws of general application, id at
888-90. Over a series of cases, influential members of the Rehnquist Court came to view
legal secularism, as it was understood in the Burger era, as implying a discriminatory and
thus unconstitutional hostility toward religion.
The answer, for these Justices, was a church-state jurisprudence guided by the principle
of equal treatment. So, for example, in 1994, in Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village
School District v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994), Justice O'Connor, concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment, wrote that, to the extent that religious needs must
constitutionally be accommodated, they should be accommodated "through laws that are
neutral with regard to religion." Id. at 714 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment). An "emphasis on equal treatment," she continued, is an "eminently sound
approach." Id. at 715. Thus, Justice O'Connor concluded that "[t]he Religion Clauses
prohibit the government from favoring religion, but they provide no warrant for
discriminating against religion." Id at 717. Similarly, in Rosenberger v. Rector and
Visitors of the University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995), the Court ruled that denial of
funds by a public university to a religious group evinced "a pervasive bias or hostility to
religion, which could undermine the very neutrality the Establishment Clause requires." Id.
at 846.
18. See infra notes 156-71,173-83, 185-88, 192-95, 197, 199-203, 210, 213-21, and 224
and accompanying text.
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that one meaning of land - the "reservation" - promises constructive re-
imaginations of both Native rights and religious freedom.
I. The "Place" ofReligion: Public Religion and Separationism19
Prior to contact with Europeans, Native peoples had no word in their
languages to describe religion.2 o It was not that they lacked religion, but
quite the contrary, that they did not classify religion as a separate realm.2 1
Instead, what Europeans called "religion" was for native people
conterminous with culture and political economy. It embraced healing,
planting, hunting, the sharing of resources and the government of
community life.2 2 But while not segregated from the rest of life, Native
religions still belong somewhere. That somewhere, first of all, is the earth.
Because the entire world is sacred, tribal religions find the spiritual realm
on earth, rather than in a metaphysically separate sphere. At a more intense
level, the sacred is encountered at the specific places - mountains, plains,
lakes, and woods - where different tribal ancestors historically lived.
Native American religions are thus local rather than portable, and collective
rather than individualistic. They are the holistic life-ways of particular
tribes, in certain geographical settings, rather than purely personal beliefs
about metaphysical matters.
Christianity, on the other hand, has conceived itself as a universal
religion, not bound to any one group or any one place. It is eminently
portable and, in contrast to tribal religions, decidedly otherworldly. But in
historical practice, Christianity, like other universalistic religions, has not
settled for being "nowhere;" instead it has striven to be everywhere and to
encompass everyone. For the non-Christian world, Christian universalism
19. Elsewhere, I have called this second model of religion "Exceptionalism," rather than
"Separationism." See Kathleen M. Sands, 'A Property of Peculiar Value': Land, Religion,
and the Constitution, 6 CULTURE & RELIGION: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL 161 (2005)
[hereinafter Sands, Property of Peculiar Value]; Kathleen Sands, Feminisms and
Secularisms, in SECULARISMS 308 (Janet R. Jakobsen & Ann Pellegrini eds., 2008). .
20. See Glen Stohr, Comment, The Repercussions of Orality in Federal Indian Law, 31
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 679, 688 (1999).
21. See Joel Brady, "Land Is Itself a Sacred, Living Being": Native American Sacred
Site Protection on Federal Public Lands Amidst the Shadows of Bear Lodge, 24 AM. INDIAN
L. REV. 153, 154 (1999-2000).
22. JOEL W. MARTIN, THE LAND LOOKS AFTER Us: A HISTORY OF NATIVE AMERICAN
RELIGION 5 (2001).
23. CLARA SUE KIDWELL ET AL., A NATIVE AMERICAN THEOLOGY 11-15 (2001); VINE
DELORIA JR., GOD Is RED: A NATIVE VIEW OF RELIGION 65-66 (3d. ed. 2003) [hereinafter
DELORIA, GOD IS RED].
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has often translated to Christian imperialism. As the Marshall cases record,
Christian imperialism created the Discovery Doctrine, which rationalized
the conquest of Native peoples and their lands.24
In the Euro-American republic, Christian universalism expressed itself in
what I will call American Public Religion. 25 This religion has taken many
forms, but for the purposes of this article, certain features are most salient.
First, what I am calling American Public Religion is not perceived by the
majority culture as a specific or "sectarian" religion. In fact, it may not be
seen as religion at all, but simply as the American ethos. Public religion is
one rather than many, generic rather than particular. It is felt to undergird
public life, providing a common fund of values and virtues without which
democracy cannot function. Finally, Public Religion goes without saying. It
functions most effectively as a set of hegemonic assumptions, and breaks
down when scrutinized and articulated.
The Christmas tree in the public square is a paradigmatic symbol of
American Public Religion, as Constitutional Law scholar Stephen Feldman
has shown.2 6 While recognizing that the Christmas tree refers to a specific
religion (Christianity), many Americans view this and other similar displays
as "nonsectarian," "secular," or simply "American." Moreover, the
Christmas tree and similar displays are closely allied with other dimensions
of the majoritarian American ethos, such as the nuclear family and
consumer capitalism. While theoretically voluntary, the majority culture
forces participation in Christmas through social conformity, while those
who dissent are accused of making "war on Christmas."2 7
24. See generally Steven T. Newcomb, The Evidence of Christian Nationalism in
Federal Indian Law: The Doctrine of Discovery, Johnson v. McIntosh, and Plenary Power,
20 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 303 (1993).
25. Jon Meacham also uses the expression "Public Religion" to describe what he sees as
the broad common beliefs shared by the Founders. See JON MEACHAM, AMERICAN GOSPEL:
GOD, THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE MAKING OF A NATION 22-27 (2007). For other helpful
essays on public religion in the thought of the founders (including James Madison and
Thomas Jefferson), see THE FOUNDERS ON GOD AND GOVERNMENT (Daniel L. Driesbach et
al. eds., 2004). What I am calling "Public Religion" also bears some similarity to the
phenomenon that Robert Bellah famously described as "American civil religion," but it is
not confined to explicitly religious (e.g., biblical) themes. See generally Robert N. Bellah,
Civil Religion in America, 96 J. AM. ACAD. ARTS & SCI. I (1967).
26. See generally STEPHEN FELDMAN, PLEASE DON'T WISH ME A MERRY CHRISTMAS: A
CRITICAL HISTORY OF THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (1998) (arguing that
Christianity is defacto established in the United States).
27. The phrase "war on Christmas" was coined by FOX news commentator Bill
O'Reilly in 2007.
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In tandem with Public Religion, however, Euro-Americans also
developed the notion of religion as a separate, private sphere of life. This
notion of religion, which I will call the Separationist model, grew out of the
Protestant Reformation. Protestant Reformers emphasized the personal,
interior character of Christian faith and they challenged the Roman Catholic
manner of uniting Church and State.28 For the three main branches of the
Reformation (Lutheran, Calvinist, and Anglican), Church and State would
remain deeply connected, albeit in new and sometimes more tolerant forms.
The result, after a century of war, is that Europe was broken into regionally
established forms of religion, based on the principle cuius regio, eius
religio (whose the rule, his the religion). 2 9 However, an initial movement in
the direction of the Separationist model had been accomplished. Rather
than only one true Church, as in medieval Catholicism, Christianity now
existed in a variety of forms, each classed. as a religion and each
empowered to rule in its own region.30
A fourth group, known as the Anabaptists or the Radical Reformers,
went a step further, some calling for a complete separation of Church and
State. It is these Radical Reformers, represented in the American colonies
by figures like Quaker William Penn (founder of Pennsylvania) and Baptist
Roger Williams (founder of Rhode Island), who provided the theological
inspiration for what would become the American Separationist idea of
religion.31 For Anabaptists, true Christianity demanded the highest level of
personal faith and moral purity, which could not be sustained where all
citizens were expected to belong to a politically established religion.32
28. The classical Protestant formulation of faith as an individual matter, and the
implications of this premise for the idea of freedom belong to Martin Luther. 1520 The
Freedom of a Christian, in MARTIN LUTHER, THREE TREATISES, Second Revised Edition,
translated by W.A. Lambert, revised by Harold J. Grimm, Fortress Press 261-316 (1970).
29. The principle cuius region, eius religio was first applied at the Peace of Augsburg in
1555 to resolve conflicts between Lutherans and Catholics in the Holy Roman Empire, and
again at the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 to resolve the Thirty Years War and the Eighty
Years War.
30. See generally BENJAMIN KAPLAN, DIVIDED BY FAITH: RELIGIOUS CONFLICT AND THE
PRACTICE OF TOLERATION IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE (2010) (narrating the evolution of
religious toleration in Europe as a result of the Protestant Reformation).
31. For a comprehensive history of the sixteenth century Anabaptist movement, see
generally GEORGE HUNTSTON WILLIAMS, THE RADICAL REFORMATION, Third Edition,
(2000).
32. Not all Anabaptists believed in the separation of Church and State. Some were
revolutionaries who attempted to institute a radically egalitarian, socialist Christian
government on earth. See generally HANS-JURGEN GOERTZ, TRANSLATED BY JOCELYN
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Rather than being situated within the polity as its foundation, religion in
the Separationist model is envisioned as outside the polity. In the influential
metaphor of Roger Williams, which was later picked up by Thomas
Jefferson, there must be "a wall of separation" between religion and
government. 3 Under the Separationist model, religions are varied rather
than the same, a source of potential conflict rather than consensus.3 4
Understood in this way, religion becomes private and personal, centered on
metaphysical beliefs, worship and prayer - in short, politically immaterial.
As Jefferson said, "it does me no injury for my neighbour to say there are
twenty gods, or no god. It neither picks my pocket nor breaks my leg."35
These models of religion - Public Religion and Separationist
Religion - are obviously contradictory. Yet this has not diminished their
historical efficacy. Public Religion is found in the Declaration of
Independence (for example, the appeal to "nature and nature's God"),3 6 in
political speeches throughout American history,37 and it is the assumptive
JAQUIERY, THOMAS MUNTZER: APOCALYPTIC MYSTIC AND REVOLUTIONARY (2000) relating
the life and thought of the most famous of the revolutionary Anabaptists.
33. In 1644, Roger Williams' wrote that
the church of the Jews under the Old Testament in the type, and the church of
the Christians under the New Testament in the antitype, were both separate
from the world, and that when they opened a gap in the hedge or wall of
separation between the Garden of the church and the wilderness of the world,
God broke down the wall itself, removed the candlestick, and made his garden
a wilderness, as at this day.
Roger Williams, Mr. Cotton's Letter Lately Printed, Examined and Answered, in ON
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: SELECTIONS FROM THE WORKS OF ROGER WILLIAMS 70 (James Calvin
Davis ed., 2008) [hereinafter Williams, Mr. Cotton's Letter]. Thomas Jefferson deployed
the same metaphor in 1802 when he wrote: "I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act
of the whole American people which declared that their legislature should 'make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof;' thus
building a wall of eternal separation between Church & State." Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist Ass'n (Jan. 1, 1802), available at http://www.loc.gov/loc/
Icib/9806/danpost.html.
34. See generally, James Madison, Federalist #10, arguing that religious factions play
the positive role of preventing any one religion from being able to seize control of the
government. The Federalist Papers, Edited by Clinton Rossiter, Penguin Putnam, 1961, 45-
52.
35. Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State Of Virginia: Religion (1787), ELECTRONIC
TEXT CTR., U. OF VA. LIBR., http://etext.virginia.edu/etcbin/toccer-new2?id=JefVirg.sgm&
images=images/modeng&data=/texts/english/modeng/parsed&tag=public&part=1 7&divisio
n=div1 (last visited Apr. 9, 2012).
36. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
37. See generally Bellah, supra note 25 (analyzing the tradition of religious references
in American presidential speeches).
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background of countless laws and policies.38  Yet it is the Separationist
model that is inscribed in the Constitution, where religion is walled off as
something unique, private, and deliberately depoliticized. Some have
argued that only one of these religious models is true to the Framers'
visions. Others argue the two models operate without serious contradiction
because each plays a distinctive role.39 As this article will amplify, there is
truth to each claim. Public Religion and Separationism, contradictory
though they are, are interdependent aspects of American discourse on
religion. Public Religion is unofficial but pervasive, and Separationism is
official but of limited influence.
When it comes to a word like "religion," logical contradictions may have
practical utility for the majority culture, which in the case of the United
States, is Euro-Protestant Christianity. In contrast to minority cultures, this
Euro-Protestant majority culture does not much need the religion clauses.
The majority's interests and values are already embedded in public life, and
this is not something that many wish to disestablish. Moreover, members
of the majority have little need for free exercise accommodation. But when
they do appeal to constitutional religious liberty, their religion is more
38. Steven K. Green offers an excellent history of the influence of majoritarian religion
on American law and policy. Tracing practices such as Sabbath closing laws, religious
oaths, and religion in schools, Green describes a gradual process of cultural, political, and
legal disestablishment that took place over the course of the nineteenth century. This
process, he contends, laid the groundwork for the twentieth century project of constitutional
disestablishment. See generally STEvEN K. GREEN, THE SECOND DISESTABLISHMENT (2010).
However, the influence of majoritarian religion on American law and policy has hardly
been eradicated. It remains evident, for example, in laws against adultery and other types of
morals legislation. See Andrew D. Cohen, How the Establishment Clause Can Influence
Substantive Due Process: Adultery Bans After Lawrence, 79 FORDHAM L. REv. 605, 609-11
(2010). As Gretchen Ruecker Hoog has documented, since the early 1980s, evangelical
Christianity has aggressively attempted to re-establish itself in American law and public
policy. Focal issues include support for school-sponsored prayer and tax funding of
religious schools, opposition to LGBT rights, abortion, stem cell research, and, generally, the
call for the restoration of "traditional values" and identification between patriotism and
(evangelical) Christian faith. See generally Gretchen Ruecker Hoog, Comment, The Liberal
University and Its Perpetuation of Evangelical Anti-Intellectualism, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
689 (2010).
39. Martin Marty, for example, argues that public religion is for the sake of order, while
Separationist religion for the sake of salvation, and both are necessary for the polity.
MARTIN E. MARTY, RELIGION AND REPUBLIC: THE AMERICAN CIRCUMSTANCE 64-73 (1987).
Another approach, held by Philip Hammond and others, is that only Separationism, not
Public Religion, is true to the vision of the founders. See PHILIP HAMMOND ET AL., RELIGION
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easily cognizable as religion in the constitutional sense, so their likelihood
of success is greater than that of religious minorities. Protestant
Christianity, after all, can be historically defined in terms of distinctive
metaphysical beliefs, styles of worship, church polity, and other sectarian
variations having little relevance to public life.
For Protestant Christians, then, Public Religion and Separationist
Religion often have made for a win-win situation. In contrast, Americans
belonging to minority cultures may lose with respect both to Public
Religion and the Separationist Religion. Public Religion tends to neglect or
even negate their distinctive values and interests. When members of
minority cultures apply for religious exemptions or accommodations, they
are more likely to find that their religions are not recognized as such for
purposes of free exercise.40
For Native Americans, this lose-lose situation is profound and
intractable. As tribal and local, their religions could not be assimilated into
a Euro-American public ethos. But neither could they be assimilated to the
Separationist model because, as holistic life-ways, Native religions cannot
be separated from their politics, economics, or cultures. Together with their
religions, tribes, and lands, Native Americans have been claimed as
"territory," conquered as "wilderness," and dispossessed as "property."
II. Wilderness, Territory, Property: Native Americans in the Euro-
American Myth of Origins
Religions often center on what scholars call myths of origin - stories
about how and why the world came into existence.4 ' A myth of origin
creates a "world," but in the process may negate, absorb, or actively destroy
40. There are many examples of the judicial denial of constitutional legitimacy to non-
Christian religions. One is the Court's declaration in an 1892 case that "this is a Christian
nation." Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892). Another is
the assertion by Justice Joseph Story that the purpose of the religion clauses was "not to
countenance, much less to advance Mahometanism, or Judaism, or infidelity, by prostrating
Christianity; but to exclude all rivalry among Christian sects." JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 701 (Ronald D. Rotunda &
John E. Nowak eds., 1987).
Stephen Feldman makes a persuasive historical argument to the effect that the religion
clauses rarely have succeeded in protecting non-Christian religious groups. He tracks in
particular the entanglement of church-state jurisprudence with the history of anti-semitism.
STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, PLEASE DON'T WISH ME A MERRY CHRISTMAS: A CRITICAL HISTORY
OF THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 8-9 (1997).
41. MIRCEA ELIADE, MYTH AND REALITY 18 (Ruth Nanda Ashen ed., Willard R. Trask
trans., 1963).
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what came before. 4 2 For the Euro-American polity, Native peoples were its
pre-history and their lands the site of origin. Euro-American Public
Religion, therefore, arose in significant part to legitimate the transformation
of Native lands into Euro-American territory and property, and of Native
peoples into subjects of the Euro-American polity.
Within Public Religion, the Constitution functions like a sacred text -
that is, as a foundational text and ultimate authority. Like other sacred
texts, the Constitution becomes efficacious by being retold, reinterpreted,
and reenacted in the present.43 It fell to Chief Justice John Marshall and his
Court to effectuate the Constitution in relation to Native peoples and lands.
In so doing, Chief Justice Marshall struggled to legitimate the violence on
which the Euro-American polity rests. This section will study two of those
cases - Johnson v. M'Intosh and Cherokee Nation v. Georgia. Later, we
will return to the third of the Marshall cases - Worcester v. Georgia
(1832) - to explore the more promising implications of "reservation" as a
metaphor for land, sovereignty, and religion.
The mythic, foundational problem Chief Justice Marshall would face is
evident in that the Constitution places Indian Nations both inside and
outside the Euro-American polity. This paradox was embedded in Article
VI of the Constitution. As noted, Article VI, by characterizing treaties as
the "supreme law of the land,"" effectively acknowledged the sovereignty
of Indian nations. However, the larger point of Article VI is to state that the
Constitution itself is the "supreme law of the land.""5 Although the primary
meaning of "supreme" is that the Constitution is the "law of laws," its
geographical implications also were momentous. Rather than being simply
the law of "the several states," which is how the clause was initially
formulated, ultimately the Constitution would have no territorial limits. It
42. See MIRCEA ELIADE, THE MYTH OF THE ETERNAL RETURN 9, 11, 69, 75 (William R.
Trask trans., 1954). According to Eliade, myths of origin symbolically bring a world ("our"
world) into being. However, he observed, myths of origin also typically acknowledge that
something existed "before" creation - e.g., the chaos that preceded cosmos, a primordial
unity out which various forms of life arise, or a paradisiacal existence that was disrupted by
sin. In this way, myths of origin "explain" conquest, division, and loss. Id. In my own view
(not Eliade's), this tends to legitimate injustice.
43. The analogy developed in this section, between the Constitution and religion via the
notion of origins, is deeply indebted to Milner Ball. See generally Milner S. Ball, Stories of
Origin and Constitutional Possibilities, 87 MIcH. L. REv. 2280 (1989).
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would be "the supreme law of the land," mythically covering the continent
from sea to shining sea.46
Johnson v. M'Intosh was the first case in which the mythic role of Native
Americans was judicially fixed. At stake was the question of whether the
tribes themselves could conduct the sale of Indian lands or whether only the
federal government could broker such sales.47 The sales in question had
occurred in the mid-1770s,4 8 before the Revolution, so the pertinent legal
framework was British. And according to the British Proclamation of 1763,
Indian lands could be directly sold only to the government, not to private
individuals or companies.49 In this sense, it was unnecessary to reach the
question of whether the Indians actually owned their land, with the main
question being the validity of the British proclamation in the American
colonies.50  But at the time of the Johnson case, the question of Indian
ownership was the most salient issue for all parties involved - the Indians,
the Euro-American disputants, and even for the judiciary itself.5 Hence,
the case of Johnson v. M'Intosh resulted in a decision that said far more in
dicta than was necessary to resolve the sole disputed issue. This decision
was profoundly consequential both for Euro-Indian relations and for
property law in the United StateS. 52
The Plaintiffs contended that the Indians did own their land, and that
their sale of it to the Wabash-Illinois land company (represented by
46. At the Constitutional Convention of 1787, the formulation referred to the
Committee of Style and Arrangement read as follows: "This Constitution and the Laws of
the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made or which
shall be made under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the
several States." See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, AT 572 (rev. ed.,
Max Farrand ed., 1967). When the clause emerged from the Committee of Style and
Arrangement, however, the Constitution had become "the supreme law of the land." Id. at
603.
47. See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 571-72 (1823).
48. Id. at 571.
49. James E. Torgerson, Indians Against Immigrants - Old Rivals, New Rules: A Brief
Review and Comparison of Indian Law in the Contiguous United States, Alaska, and
Canada, 14 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 57, 58 (1988-1989).
50. See STUART BANNER, How THE INDIANS LOST THEIR LAND: LAW AND POWER ON THE
FRONTIER 117 (2005).
51. The suit arose from a collusion engineered by attorney Robert Goodloe Harper. See
LINDSEY G. ROBERTSON, CONQUEST BY LAW: HOW THE DISCOVERY OF AMERICA
DISPOSSESSED INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OF THEIR LANDS 47-53 (2005).
52. See David E. Wilkins, Johnson v. M'Intosh Revisited: Through the Eyes of Mitchel
v. United States, 19 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 159, 162 (1994).
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2012
AMERICAN INDIAN LA WREVIEW
shareholder Johnson) remained valid.53 In their opening argument by Daniel
Webster, they contended that according to the law of civilized nations, the
property rights of conquered nations are not abridged by conquest.54
Neither the (presumed) fact that Indians were savages nor the collective
character of their ownership obviated this right. Webster cited Hugo
Grotius to the effect that even conquered lands remained "the property of
the first occupier, whether it be the King or the whole people."ss Whatever
the precise nature of Indian title, plaintiffs contended the very fact that
Indian lands had been bought was evidence that Indians indeed had owned
those lands. The polity itself rested on this premise, they argued, because
"all, or nearly all, the lands in the United States, is holden under purchases
from the Indian nations."5 The only issue was whether these sales could be
made to individuals or to the government alone, 5 and plaintiffs maintained
that sales to individuals were valid unless specifically prohibited by
statute. Property, in this reasoning, had a logical and even historical
priority over territory. First, land is owned privately and then, with the
consent of the owners, becomes the territory of their chosen government.
After the Indians had sold some of their lands to the Wabash-Illinois
Company, defendant M'Intosh had purchased some of those lands from the
federal government.59  In his opinion, Marshall contended that, post-
conquest, Indians held only a right of occupancy to their land, not a right of
53. See Jen Camden & Kathryn E. Fort, "Channeling Thought": The Legacy of Legal
Fictions from 1823, 33 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 77, 87 (2008-2009).
54. See Eric Kades, History and Interpretation of the Great Case of Johnson v.
M'Intosh, 19 LAW& HIST. REv. 67, 102-03 (2001).
55. 2 HUGO GROTIUS, ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE ch. 2, 1 IV (A.C. Campbell
trans., 1814) (1625) ("The General Rights of Things"), available at http://www.consti
tution.org/ gro/djbp_202.htm, cited in Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 563
note a (1823). Grotius wrote:
Now in these cases there are two things to be pointed out, which are a double
kind of occupancy that may take place; the one in the name of the Sovereign, or
of a whole people, the other by individuals, converting into private estates the
lands which they have so occupied. The latter kind of individual property
proceeds rather from assignment than from free occupancy. Yet any places that
have been taken possession of in the name of a sovereign, or of a whole people,
though not portioned out amongst individuals, are not to be considered as waste
lands, but as the property of the first occupier, whether it be the King, or a
whole people.
Id.
56. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 563.
57. Id. at 571-72.
58. See Kades, supra note 47, at 102-03.
59. Wilkins, supra note 45, at 161.
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fee title ownership.60 At the time of the initial sale, the land belonged to the
British crown by right of conquest. It had then fallen to Virginia after the
Revolutionary War, and then to the federal government once Virginia ceded
its excess lands to the new republic in 1802.61 The defense argument relied
explicitly on the assertion that the Indians were "an inferior race of people,
without the privileges of citizens."62
Here, the defense implicitly invoked the metaphor of wilderness, to
describe both Indian land and the Indians themselves. Indians, they argued,
remained "in a state of nature," neither owning land individually nor
improving it by cultivation.63 This oft-repeated assertion, though counter-
factual, was a cornerstone of the argument against Indian title. Since
Native people did not want or need the land as private property, they could
assert no ownership rights, nor could they be regarded as sovereign
nations.64
The defense's argument thus ignored the implication of Article VI,
which was favorable to Indians (that their treaties with the federal
government implied their status as sovereign nations), while relying on the
unfavorable implication of Article VI (that the federal government exerted
sovereignty over the entire land mass, and therefore over Indian nations as
well).65  With this reasoning, the America's lands were government
territory before they could become private property. By virtue of the
Discovery Doctrine, the lands of America rightfully belonged to whichever
European power discovered them. "[T]he whole theory of their titles to
lands in America rests upon the hypothesis that the Indians had no right of
soil as sovereign, independent nations."66  From the Euro-American
perspective, property was born as territory, owned by the conquering power
and only then transferred to private individuals at the conqueror's
discretion. Indians occupied this territory, but had no independent right to
sell it.
In Johnson, Chief Justice Marshall offered, in effect, a different myth of
origins than the one narrated by plaintiffs. The transformation of land into
60. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 587.
61. See id. at 576.
62. Id. at 569.
63. Id. at 566.
64. Id. at 567.
65. It was true, the defendants conceded, that Indians had been paid for their lands.
However, this had been done only for the sake of keeping the peace, not because Indians had
a right to payment. In short, the Wabash-Illinois land company did not rightfully own the
lands in question because the Indian occupants had no rightful title to sell. Id. at 570.
66. Id. at 567.
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private property had to be mediated by its prior transformation into
territory, and the latter was something only the government could do. His
opinion, a version of the Discovery Doctrine, was "that discovery gave title
to the government by whose subjects, or by whose authority, it was made,
against all other European governments, which title might be consummated
by possession."6 7 In the Worcester decision, Chief Justice Marshall would
emphasize the second to the last clause ("against all European nations"),68
but here he did not. Discovery gave to the conquering power more than a
right over and against other European nations. It also gave the discoverer
"absolute ultimate title" to the land, leaving the original inhabitants with
only a "title of occupancy" - that is, a right to live on and use the land.
This occupancy right could be extinguished only by the government, and
could occur either through purchase or conquest.70 Euro-American citizens,
therefore, could purchase Indian lands only through the government.
To justify the existing state of affairs, Chief Justice Marshall might have
employed the Lockean version of natural law proposed by the defense; he
might have claimed that Indians, because they (supposedly) had not
"enclosed" and "improved" the land, had no natural right to ownership. But
he hesitated to deploy this strategy of legitimation. "We will not enter into
the controversy, whether agriculturists, merchants, and manufacturers, have
a right, on abstract principles, to expel hunters from the territory they
possess, or to contract their limits." 7 1 Although individuals may hold
"private and speculative opinions" about the justice of these claims,72 Chief
Justice Marshall found it disingenuousness to defend, as right, a state of
affairs that had been established by sheer force.
With painful honesty, he observed that the Court itself - in other words,
Marshall himself - relied on this a priori reality. "Conquest gives a title
which the Courts of the conqueror cannot deny." 73 "The title by conquest is
acquired and maintained by force."74 By fact, if not by right, the nation
rested on conquest.75 So, he concluded:
67. Id. at 573.
68. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
69. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 592.
70. Id. at 587.
71. Id. at 588.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 588-59.
75. Philip Frickey argued persuasively that in Johnson, Chief Justice Marshall was
forced to acknowledge that with respect to Native Americans, the polity had been created by
sheer force. Frickey argues that in Worcester, when Marshall was addressing a situation of
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However extravagant the pretension of converting the discovery
of an inhabited country into conquest may appear; if the
principle has been asserted in the first instance, and afterwards
sustained; if a country has been acquired and held under it; if the
property of the great mass of the community originates in it, it
becomes the law of the land, and cannot be questioned.76
For Chief Justice Marshall, then, the land of America became the
territory of the United States through a founding act of conquest, and it
became the property of U.S. citizens by prolonged domination of the
indigenous inhabitants. Strikingly, he referred to this violent situation with
the same expression that the Constitution uses to refer to itself - "the law
of the land." The Constitution and this state of violence are co-implicated;
both are, in some sense, "the law of the land."
While declining to deploy the available philosophical justification for
conquest, Chief Justice Marshall did display sympathy with its theological
justification. The Discovery Doctrine, he observed, was a religious claim
as well as a matter of force. It was a pope who first articulated the
doctrine,77 and it had been accepted by all European nations, Protestant and
Catholic alike. As practiced by European nations and (in particular) by
Great Britain, the Discovery Doctrine was religiously circumscribed. It
"was confined to countries 'then unknown to all Christian people' and it
permitted them to take lands "notwithstanding the occupancy of the natives,
who were heathens, and, at the same time, admitting the prior title of any
Christian people who may have made a previous discovery.,78
Chief Justice Marshall himself apparently shared these theological
premises. In an extra-judicial context, he had stated that "the American
population is entirely Christian, & with us, Christianity & Religion are
(post-conquest) colonialism, he attempts to mitigate this relationship of force by subjecting it
to principles of law. See generally Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present:
Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L.
REv. 381 (1993).
76. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 591.
77. In his Bull of Demarcation (1493), Pope Alexander VI divided the New World
between Spain and Portugal. The chief purpose of all expeditions and conquests, stated the
Bull, was "to induce the people who inhabit the foresaid islands and continents to embrace
the Christian religion[.]" SAMUEL EDWARD DAWSON, THE LINES OF DEMARCATION OF POPE
ALEXANDER VI AND THE TREATY OF TORDESILLAs A.D. 1493 AND 1494, at 533 (1899),
microformed on CIHM/ICMH Microfiche Series 1980 (Canadian Institute for Historical
Microreproductions), available at http://ia600401.us.archive.org/2/items/cihm_02614/cihm_
02614.pdf.
78. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 576-77.
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identified." 7 9 Moreover, in his remaining Native American cases, Marshall
explicitly assumed that conversion of Indians to Christianity was a
necessary and appropriate policy of the federal government.
It might be supposed that of these two lines of reasoning - one based in
the theology of Christianity, the other based in the reality of violence -
Marshall himself believed only the latter. In that case, what he did in the
Johnson decision was not to create a public theology, but to unmask
theology as an ideological cover-up for material interests. Another
interpretation, truer to the genuine ambivalence of the text, is that Chief
Justice Marshall did indeed voice a theology in this decision - a theology
in which the depravity of nature means that law, rather than emerging
"naturally," must be violently imposed. Civilization as such could be seen
as a kind of law. And among civilized people, it is indeed true that "the
conquered shall not be wantonly oppressed" and that "the rights of the
conquered to property should remain unimpaired."8 0 But civilization - for
Marshall of a piece with Christianization - lay at the heart of the matter.
For these humane rules of conquest apply only when the conquered people
can be incorporated into the society of the conqueror. For Chief Justice
Marshall, as for his Euro-American contemporaries, this was presumed to
require the incorporation of Native Americans into Christianity. While
Christians among themselves may find nature ordered and law nascent
within it, apart from Christianity what we have is not lawful nature but
fallen nature - in other words, "wilderness." As Marshall put it:
[T]he tribes of Indians inhabiting this country were fierce
savages, whose occupation was war, and whose subsistence was
drawn chiefly from the forest. To leave them in possession of
their country, was to leave the country a wilderness; to govern
them as a distinct people, was impossible, because they were as
brave and as high spirited as they were fierce, and were ready to
repel by arms every attempt on their independence.
Chief Justice Marshall's justification of state violence in Johnson would
return to haunt him in 1831. Emboldened by the Chief Justice's 1823
version of the Discovery Doctrine, the state of Georgia attempted to
forcibly remove the Cherokee Nation from the external boundaries of the
79. Letter from John Marshall to Jasper Adams (May 9, 1833), in RELIGION AND
PoLInCS IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: JASPER ADAMS AND THE CHURCH-STATE DEBATE 18-19
(Daniel L. Dreisbach ed., 1996).
80. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 589.
81. Id. at 590.
270 [Vol. 36
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol36/iss2/1
No. 2] TERRITORY, WILDERNESS, PROPERTY & RESERVATION 271
state. In 1828 and 1829, its legislature had passed laws incorporating
Cherokee territory into Georgia and subjecting the Cherokee people to
Georgia state law.82 Georgia's action, although it challenged the federal
government, was in keeping with a policy that the federal government
began to push vigorously in the 1820s: the voluntary removal of all eastern
Indians to the area west of the Mississippi River.83
With the Removal Act of 1830, this policy became federal law. 8 4 The
Removal Act was supposed to encourage the voluntary migration of Indian
nations, 5 but this occurred only slowly and sometimes not at all.86 Georgia
had been relying on the removal policy. In 1802, when the state ceded its
excess lands to the federal government, it had the understanding that the
federal government would encourage the Cherokees to leave Georgia as
soon as practicable.87 By the late 1820s, Georgia was aggrieved with the
federal government for failing to secure the Cherokees' voluntary
emigration, and its anger intensified when gold was discovered on
Cherokee land. It was in this context that Georgia had set about
dissolving the Cherokee Nation through its own legislative measures.89
And by the late 1830s, the federal government too would impose removal
by force, leading most infamously to the Trail of Tears on which thousands
of Cherokees were to perish 90
82. See Matthew L. Sundquist, Worcester v. Georgia: A Breakdown in the Separation of
Powers, 35 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 239, 240 (2010-2011). As the Cherokee bill to the Supreme
Court also complained, Georgia had enforced this claim by hanging a Cherokee, Corn
Tassels (a.k.a. George Tassels) for a crime (murder of another Cherokee inside Cherokee
Territory) that ought to have remained under tribal jurisdiction. Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 12-13 (1831).
83. See Sundquist, supra note 72, at 241-42; Suzianne D. Painter-Thorne, One Step
Forward, Two Giant Steps Back: How the "Existing Indian Family" Exception (Re)Imposes
Anglo American Legal Values on American Indian Tribes to the Detriment of Cultural
Autonomy, 33 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 329, 343 (2008-2009).
84. Ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411.
85. Carye Cole Chapman, Railroads Across Tribal Lands, 20 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 489,
494 (1995-1996).
86. James A. Casey, Note, Sovereignty by Sufferance: The Illusion of Indian Tribal
Sovereignty, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 404, 411 (1994) (noting that "[violuntary removal was not
expeditious").
87. Earl M. Maltz, Brown and Tee-Hit-Ton, 29 Am. INDIAN L. REV. 75, 87 (2004-2005).
88. See Sundquist, supra note 72, at 242.
89. See Shockey, supra note 12, at 279-80.
90. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Red Leaves and the Dirty Ground: The Cannibalism of
Law and Economics, 33 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 33, 47 (2008-2009).
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Chief Justice Marshall thought this removal policy inhumane and
abhorred (in particular) Georgia's imperious cruelty to the Cherokees. "If
courts were permitted to indulge their sympathies, a case better calculated
to excite them can scarcely be imagined."9' Ultimately, Chief Justice
Marshall would refuse to rule on this case. For one thing, he worried that a
ruling in this case might violate the political question doctrine. To
intervene against the Georgia legislature, he wrote, "savours too much of
the exercise of political power to be within the proper province of the
judicial department." 9 2
This particular compunction would evaporate in the Worcester case, but
in the Cherokee case, the Chief Justice decided that the merits of the case
would not be reached because of a prior question of standing. According to
Article III, Section 2, only a foreign nation could sue a state in the Supreme
Court.93  The decisive question became whether the Cherokees were a
foreign nation in relation to the United States.94 Chief Justice Marshall's
response - that the Cherokees were in fact a nation, but a "domestic
dependent" 95 rather than a foreign nation - would seal the unique and
anomalous position of Indian Nations as both inside and outside the
constitutional order.
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia is the only case in the Marshall trilogy in
which a First Nation made its own arguments, and those arguments evoked
the rule of law. Raising the equivalent of natural law, the Cherokees argued
that they had lived in the land from time immemorial, "deriving their title
from the Great Spirit, who is the common father of the human family, and
to whom the whole earth belongs."9 They also reinterpreted the Discovery
Doctrine as a lawful agreement among the European nations, rather than as
a justification of force.
Understood as a matter of positive law, the Discovery Doctrine could not
be binding upon the Indian nations who had never accepted it. Discovery
conferred only a right of preemption - in other words, a right to buy the
lands of a conquered region from its original inhabitants, should the
inhabitants chose to sell. Preemption was a right that the conquering nation
(for example, Great Britain) held over other European nations who had
agreed to the doctrine for the sake of peace among themselves, not over
91. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 15 (1831).
92. Id. at 20.
93. U.S. CONST. art. 111, § 2.
94. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 16.
95. Id. at 17.
96. Id. at 3.
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Indian nations. It in no way negated the title of Indian Nations to their
homelands, nor their right to sell those lands to whomever they chose. By
natural law as well as the law of nations, plaintiffs argued, the Cherokee
Nation truly owned its lands.
The Cherokees also held the United States to its own laws. The Georgia
legislature had violated the federal Trade and Intercourse Act of 1802,
which decreed that only the federal government, not state governments,
could regulate Indian trade and manage Indian affairs. Finally, the United
States, in failing to constrain Georgia, had violated its own supreme law:
the Constitution." In particular, the United States had violated Article VI,
which makes treaties the law of the land.'00 According to its treaties with
the federal government, and by the very act of making those treaties, the
Cherokees were recognized as a sovereign nation, with a defined territory
and a right to self-government. In the words of the Cherokee brief, they
were "a foreign state, not owing allegiance to the United States, nor to any
state of this union, nor to any prince, potentate or state, other than their
own."101 The Treaty of Holston (1791) was particularly pertinent to the
removal crisis because it specifically provided that those Cherokees who
choose to remain in their eastern territory "for the purpose of engaging in
the pursuits of agricultural and civilized life" could rely "on the patronage,
aid and good neighbourhood of the United States."l02
In the Worcester decision, Chief Justice Marshall would embrace this
more lawful, rational version of the Discovery Doctrine laid out by the
Cherokees, reversing what he had asserted in Johnson v. M'Intosh. But in
the Cherokee case, he was not yet prepared to do that. Instead, he asserted
that the United States had no east-west geographical boundaries other than
the continental landmass itself; from coast to coast, the republic's territory
was destined to be "everywhere." "The Indian territory," he wrote, "is
admitted to compose a part of the United States . . . [and] they are
considered as within the jurisdictional limits of the United States."l 03
97. See id. at 16.
98. Michael C. Blumm, Retracing the Discovery Doctrine: Aboriginal Title, Tribal
Sovereignty, and Their Significance to Treaty-Making and Modern Natural Resources
Policy in Indian Country, 28 VT. L. REv. 713, 755 (2004).
99. Id.
100. U.S. CONsT. art. VI.
101. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 3.
102. Id. at 5-6.
103. Id. at 17.
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As frankly as in the Johnson case, the Chief Justice described this
situation as the result of force. "They occupy a territory to which we assert
a title independent of their will," with the Cherokees retaining only a "right
of possession."'0 So, while the United States would be everywhere, the
Cherokees were destined to be nowhere. As Justice Johnson suggested in a
separate opinion, the Indians were something like the Israelites in the
desert, without property or territory, but still technically free to regulate
their own members.' 05 By this reasoning, some of Chief Justice Marshall's
associates argued, the Cherokees not only lacked status as a foreign nation;
they were not nations in any legal sense. 06 Chief Justice Marshall was not
prepared to go that far, partly because as a committed federalist, he wanted
to constrain the imperious Georgia. The Cherokee people were a nation, he
insisted, but not a foreign nation. 07
It can be argued that the Chief Justice's version of the Discovery
Doctrine, as a myth of violent origins, was the decisive reason for his denial
of Cherokee standing as a foreign nation. Just as discovery, in Chief Justice
Marshall's telling, was an act of sheer force over indigenous peoples, so the
constitutional order forcibly transformed Native American lands into the
territory of the federal government. This is why the Cherokee effort to hold
the United States to its own supreme law - the Constitution - could not
serve them.
The Cherokees pointed to Article VI to make the case that treaties
implied sovereign nations and were as supreme as the Constitution itself.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 27 (Johnson, J., concurring).
106. See id. at 27-28 (Johnson, J., concurring).
107. Id. at 17 (majority opinion). In support of this mixed conclusion, Chief Justice
Marshall turned to actions of the federal government through which Indian tribes were
treated as distinct political entities.
The numerous treaties made with them by the United States recognize them as
a people capable of maintaining the relations of peace and war, of being
responsible in their political character for any violation of their engagements, or
for any aggression committed on the citizens of the United States by any
individual of their community. Laws have been enacted in the spirit of these
treaties. The acts of our government plainly recognize the Cherokee nation as a
state, and the courts are bound by those acts.
Id. at 16. Marshall went on to argue, however, that the Constitution did not classify Indian
tribes as foreign nations, for the Commerce clause authorized Congress "to regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states and with Indian tribes." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8. Had the founders understood Indian tribes as foreign nations, Marshall
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But the supremacy Chief Justice Marshall had in mind was a different
aspect of Article VI - the supremacy of the federal Constitution over all
other contenders, be they states or Indian nations. When he asserted that
the Cherokees were "in our territory," he was informing Georgia that the
Cherokee nation was part of federal territory, and not of state territory. For
the Cherokees, this meant that the Constitution's supremacy, far from
affirming Indian sovereignty, radically truncated it. It also meant that the
Constitution, rather than binding only the Euro-Americans who had
consented to it, also bound Indians by force.
Even the limited sovereignty of Indian tribes as "domestic and dependent
nations" appeared, in the Chief Justice's imagination, destined to end.
Although he underscored that existing Cherokee lands must not be taken by
force, his choice of words ("when" not "if") 108 assumed that eventually they
would cede the land voluntarily. The title of the United States to Cherokee
land "must take effect in point of possession when their right of possession
ceases."' 09 In the interim, the Cherokee would live under what Chief
Justice Marshall saw as the benign domination of the United States.
"Meanwhile," he continued, "they are in a state of pupilage. Their
relation[] to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian."Ho
With these influential words, the Chief Justice gave judicial authority to the
"Civilization Policy" that had been enacted into law by Congress in 1819
and that remained federal Indian policy throughout the nineteenth century
and well into the twentieth. The aim of the government's Indian policy was
civilization leading to assimilation, and civilization was a package deal. It
entailed conversion to Christianity, the private ownership and cultivation of
land, and a host of other adaptations to Euro-American culture, such as
English-only communication, Euro-American sex-gender roles, and the
wearing of "citizen's dress."11
108. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17 ("They occupy a territory to which we assert a title
independent of their will, which must take effect in point of possession when their right of
possession ceases.") (emphasis added).
109. Id.
110. Id.
S11. According to R. Pierce Beaver, the federal policy linking Christian conversion with
"civilization" was first developed by Henry Knox, the Secretary of War under George
Washington. See R. PIERCE BEAVER, CHURCH, STATE AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS: Two
AND A HALF CENTURIES OF PARTNERSHIP IN MISSIONS BETWEEN PROTESTANT CHURCHES AND
GOVERNMENT 63-65 (1966). The Civilization Fund, established by act of Congress in 1819,
permanently allocated funds (initially $10,000 per year) "to employ capable persons of good
moral character, to instruct the Indians ..... Native American people were to be instructed
in "the mode of agriculture, and of such mechanic arts are suited to the condition of the
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As the plaintiffs pointed out, however, the Treaty of Holston (1819) had
specifically promised the Cherokees that in return for embracing the
civilization program, they would not be forced to leave their ancestral
homelands.1 2 And in fact many of the Cherokees had become "civilized
Christians" and had turned from hunting to agriculture." 3 In addition, the
Cherokee Nation had created for itself a constitution modeled on that of the
United States.' 14 On the Euro-American side, however, racial prejudice
could discount these adaptations."5 "Civilization" in any case was a double
bind, because to succeed at it was to largely destroy the traditional life-
ways of the Cherokees, as a tribal community belonging to a particular
geographical place. Just as the domination by Euro-Americans was as
Indians[,]" and their children were to learn reading and writing (in English) and arithmetic.
The education of Native Americans was to be carried out by persons "of good moral
character" under the authority of the President. Although the legislation did not specify that
the teachers should be missionaries, in fact the monies did go largely to missionaries, who
already were involved with Indian education. Id. at 68-69.
According to Robert Berkhofer, civilization (i.e., Europeanization) and Christianization
were distinguished by the missionaries themselves, with some missionaries prioritizing the
former and others the latter. In any case, both were aspects of the missionary goals. See
ROBERT BERKHOFER, SALVATION AND THE SAVAGE: AN ANALYSIS OF PROTESTANT MISSIONS
AND AMERICAN INDIAN RESPONSE, 1787-1862, at 4-10 (1972).
112. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 5-6.
113. Id. at 6.
114. In Marshall's words, the Cherokees had
established a constitution and form of government, the leading features of
which they have borrowed from that of the United States; dividing their
government into three separate departments, legislative, executive and
judicial. . . . They have established schools for the education of their children,
and churches in which the Christian religion is taught; they have abandoned the
hunter state, and become agriculturists, mechanics, and herdsmen; and, under
provocations long continued and hard to be borne, they have observed, with
fidelity, all their engagements by treaty with the United States. Under the
promised "patronage and good neighbourhood" of the United States, a portion
of the people of the nation have become civilized Christians and agriculturists;
and the bill alleges that in these respects they are willing to submit to a
comparison with their white brethren around them.
Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 6.
115. As Justice Johnson put it in his concurring opinion:
Independently of the general influence of humanity, these people were restless, warlike, and
signally cruel in their irruptions during the revolution. The policy, therefore, of enticing
them to the arts of peace, and to those improvements which war might lay desolate, was
obvious; and it was wise to prepare them for what was probably then contemplated, to wit, to
incorporate them in time into our respective governments: a policy which their inveterate
habits and deep seated enmity has altogether baffled.
Id. at 23-24 (Johnson, J., concurring).
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religious as it was political, so was the injury on the Cherokee side. The
land from which the Euro-American government wished to separate the
Cherokees was, as the Chief Justice himself observed, "consecurate in their
affections from having been immemorially the property and residence of
their ancestors, and from containing now the graves of their fathers,
relatives, and friends.""'6 To move west of the Mississippi would endanger
both the spiritual and the physical survival of the Cherokees. It would be,
in Chief Justice Marshall's paraphrase, "the grave not only of their
civilization and Christianity, but of the nation itself."ll7
III. Native Americans Under the Regime ofEuro-American Public Religion
Chief Justice Marshall's decisions, though deeply telling in regard to
American Public Religion, were not in his view related to the Free Exercise
or Establishment Clauses. In fact, the religion clauses of the Constitution
were barely operative at the time of the first Native American decisions.
They were inoperative, most obviously, because it was not until the 1940s
that they were incorporated to the states."'8 But there also existed a less
obvious and more pervasive reason for the dormancy of the religion
clauses. American Public Religion, in the form Chief Justice Marshall knew
it, remained relatively uncontested until the arrival of Catholics in the mid-
nineteenth century." 9
Despite their inactivity, the religion clauses remained in the Constitution,
outlining the official relationship between the United States and religion. In
contrast to the unofficial Public Religion that Marshall assumed, the
Constitution conceives religion not as public territory but as private
property, segregated from the pervading public space. It was succinctly
contained in the metaphor employed by James Madison when he wrote, "[A
man] has a property of peculiar value in his religious opinions, and in the
profession and practice dictated by them."l 2 0
116. Id. at 9 (majority opinion).
117. Id.
118. Stephen M. Feldman, Religious Minorities and the First Amendment: The History,
the Doctrine, and the Future, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 222, 238 (2003).
119. See Douglas Laycock, Continuity and Change in the Threat to Religious Liberty:
The Reformation Era and the Late Twentieth Century, 80 MINN. L. REv. 1047, 1067-68
(1996).
120. James Madison, Property, in 1 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 266-68 (William T.
Hutchison et al. eds. 1962), available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edulfounders/documents/
vlchl6s23.html.
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Religion in this imagery was personal business, the sovereign territory of
the individual conscience on which government may not encroach. The
property to which Madison referred was first of all the sovereign self - the
man who owns and rules himself according to his unique and inviolable
conscience. But property also referred to individually owned land.
Literally, property was a condition of citizenship;121 and metaphorically, the
territory of the citizen's self-sovereignty. Viewed through this lens,
government appears very different than through the lens of Public Religion.
Here, government is strictly limited, and its authoritative source is
individual conscience rather than a common faith. 122
Indians, on the other hand, appeared to lack property in the sense of
individually owned land. To Chief Justice Marshall and his
contemporaries, this absence of property amounted to an absence of both
religion and civilization. Recall that wilderness was a key part of the Chief
Justice's reasoning in Johnson v. M'Intosh. Indian tribes had left their
"country a wilderness,"' 23 and this legitimated the claim of Europeans to
politically dominate and legally own Indian lands. Like wilderness,
property is an ideological construct rather than a factual description, and its
ideological provenance (which Chief Justice Marshall also assumed) was
Christian. Wilderness referred to heathen people as well as uncultivated
lands, while property evoked civilized people tending their private gardens.
The wilderness/property dichotomy thus reflected the doctrine of a fallen,
depraved nature in need of both Christian salvation and Euro-American
government.
From the start, the image of wilderness also played a decisive role in
church-state jurisprudence through Roger Williams' metaphor of a wall
separating the church from the "wilderness" beyond.124 Religion, cultivated
within these walls, was metaphorically associated with property. For
121. Jacob Katz Cogan, Note, The Look Within: Property, Capacity and Suffrage in
Nineteenth Century America, 107 YALE L.J 473, 476 (1997).
122. Cogan writes: "Whereas the eighteenth century looked to property for guidance in
determining a person's fitness to vote, the nineteenth century turned to the soundness of a
person's mind." Id. at 495. However, he concludes, evaluating the "inner self" remained a
"difficult proposition." Id. at 497. "So it was that the look within possessed a sad irony:
Americans, for all their searching inward, could not, in the end, help but look outward." Id.
at 498.
123. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 590 (1823).
124. For a full discussion of Williams' view, see generally TIMOTHY L. HALL,
SEPARATING CHURCH AND STATE: ROGER WILLIAMS AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (1998).
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Williams, the wilderness included both the Indians and the government.125
Jefferson, as is well known, had a far more favorable view of government
and a far less favorable view of religion.126
Neither the evangelical nor the enlightened strains of Separationism
confined God or religion entirely within "the wall." For Williams, the
wilderness, while devoid of Christian revelation, nonetheless knew what
Williams called the "Second Table" of the law (the last six of the Ten
Commandments).127 These divine laws were laid upon all people and could
be obeyed by all. Obedience to these commands, while not sufficient for
salvation, was sufficient to make people governable. This implied, in
Williams' thought, a distinction between Christianization and civilization;
the latter could be accomplished without the former. In fact, Williams
pointedly observed that the indigenous people adhered to the Second Table
as well or better than most Englishmen - a view perhaps related to his
unusual regard for the land ownership rights of Native Americans.128
125. See Williams, Mr. Cotton's Letter, supra note 26, at 70 (discussing Williams' view
of the link between wilderness and government). Williams' association between wilderness
and Native Americans was best expressed by his discussion of their ability to survive "in this
wild and howling land." See Roger Williams, A Key into the Languages ofAmerica (1643),
in 1 THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF ROGER WILLIAMS 47 (Perry Miller ed., 2005).
126. Like Williams, Jefferson was a strong critic of ecclesiastical corruption (denouncing
"the impious presumption of legislators and rulers, civil as well as ecclesiastical" who are
merely "fallible and uninspired men") and an equally strong proponent of religious freedom.
See Thomas Jefferson, The Virginia Act for Establishing Religious Freedom (1779),
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM LIBR., UNIV. OF VA., http://religiousfreedom.lib.virginia.edu/sacred/
vaact.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2012). But Jefferson was far more heterodox, rejecting key
doctrines of Christianity, such as the original sin, the divinity of Christ, and the Trinity. See
EDWIN S. GAUSTAD, SWORN ON THE ALTAR OF GOD: A RELIGIOUS BIOGRAPHY OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 136, 206 (1996). While Williams imagined civil government as a "wilderness"
that could be capably managed by the reprobate, see Williams, Mr. Cotton's Letter, supra
note 26, at 70, for Jefferson, civil government was a rational enterprise, which is why he was
so eager to develop an educated citizenry, see GAUSTAD, supra, at 147-80.
127. Roger Williams, The Bloody Tenent of Persecution for the Cause of Conscience, in
DAVIS, supra note 26, at 116. These moral laws, Williams believed, were available even to
"natural and unregenerate men" and were sufficient for civil government. As a primary
illustration of this point, Williams opined that "the wildest Indians in America ought (and in
their own kind and several degrees do) to agree upon some form of government, some more
civil compact in towns and etc., some less." And that "[T]heir civil and earthly governments
be as lawful and true as any governments in the world. . . ." Id. at 131, 133.
128. Williams' advocacy for Native land ownership was among the reasons for his
conflict with the leaders of Massachusetts and his eventual banishment. See Jeffrey Glover,
Wunnaumwayean: Roger Williams, English Credibility, and the Colonial Land Market, 41
EARLY AM. LIT. 429, 432-34 (2006). Upon arriving in Rhode Island, he bought land directly
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For Jefferson too, the un-walled regions of America had a double
meaning: sometimes he imagined them as wild, sometimes as governed by
natural law. Natural law came to mind when Jefferson was thinking of
relations among Europeans. But when thinking of indigenous Americans,
Jefferson, like his cousin John Marshall, would revert to images of
wilderness. In the Declaration of Independence, addressing the other
European nations and in particular Great Britain, he famously invoked "the
Laws of Nature and Nature's God."l 29 Later in the same document, when
he referred to the Indian lands not yet under Euro-American control, nature
suddenly appears Godless; it is inhabited by "the merciless Indian
savages."',30  Human nature itself, then, was riven by a tension between
lawfulness and wildness.
This dual assessment of human nature characterized both Jefferson's
thinking about Native Americans and his Indian policy as President.
According to Anthony Wallace, Jefferson vigorously rejected the theory
that Native Americans were of inferior intelligence to whites.' 31 Instead,
Jefferson espied in Native people what he took to be the universal human
capacities for reason and morality, albeit at a lower stage of development.132
Nonetheless, Wallace shows that Jefferson was unable to see indigenous
religions as anything but "superstitious nonsense"'33 and believed that these
religions, along with Indian cultures as a whole, were destined to end.134
Despite his remarkably heterodox theology, President Jefferson would
continue the policy (begun by Henry Knox during the Washington
administration) of lending federal support to Christian missionaries who
were given the task of "civilizing" the Indians.135 Not coincidentally, the
cultural disappearance of Native Americans was a precondition of what
from the Narragansetts - a purchase obliquely noted and explained away as anomalous by
Marshall in Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 601-02 (1823).
129. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
130. Id. para. 29.
131. ANTHONY F. C. WALLACE, JEFFERSON AND THE INDIANS: THE TRAGIC FATE OF THE
FIRST AMERICANS 77 (1999).
132. Id. at 95-96.
133. Id. at 110.
134. According to Anthony Wallace, Jefferson believed that Indian cultures were
destined to end, which is why he (Jefferson) busily engaged in the collection of Indian
artifacts. See id. at 75-107. But Jefferson did not regard Indian religions as worthy of the
name, and therefore had little interest in them. In Notes on Virginia, as Wallace mentions,
Jefferson "has nothing to say about [Indian] religious beliefs and rituals, which of course he
would be apt to dismiss as superstitious nonsense in any case." Id. at 122.
135. Id. at 168-69.
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Wallace showed was Jefferson's overriding interest, which was the
acquisition of Indian lands. 36
But while Euro-Protestant religious sensibilities controlled life on both
sides of the "wall," on neither side were Native American religions
recognized as such or protected from government intrusion. The apparent
absence of private property among native people signaled a wildness that
needed taming by Euro-American government and Christian missionaries.
As Governor Morris had commented during the Constitutional Convention
of 1787, "Men do not enter into Society to preserve their Lives or
Liberty - the Savages possesses both in perfection - they unite in Society
for the Protection of Property." 3 7 As early as 1776, Congress had resolved
to place Christian ministers among the Indians, both for purposes of
conversion and to encourage agriculture and other "civil arts.""' In 1779,
President Washington ordered Indian commissioners to arrange for
Christian missionaries to work with Native peoples, and subsequent
presidents followed suit.'3 9 By the late eighteenth century, many Christian
denominations in the United States had missionary societies specifically
devoted to Native Americans.140 In 1819, Congress formalized its support
for the missionaries' policies by setting up a "Civilization Fund" that would
help support Christian missions to the Indians.141 In 1873, President Grant
136. See id. at 205, 206-40.
137. Notes of Rufus King in the Federal Convention of 1787 (July 5th), YALE LAW
SCHOOL, THE AVALON PROJECT: DOCUMENTS IN LAW, HISTORY AND DIPLOMACY, http://
avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/king.asp (last visited Apr. 10, 2012).
138. Justice MacLean, in his concurring opinion in Worcester v. Georgia, quoted the
government's 1776 commissioning of missionaries as follows:
In April 1776, it was "resolved, that the commissioners of Indian affairs in the
middle department, or any one of them, be desired to employ, for reasonable
salaries, a minister of the gospel, to reside among the Delaware Indians, and
instruct them in the Christian religion; a school master, to teach their youth
reading, writing, and arithmetic; also, a blacksmith, to do the work of the
Indians."
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 574 (1832) (M'Lean, J., concurring).
139. See Louis Fisher, Indian Religious Freedom: To Litigate or Legislate?, 26 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 1, 1-3 (2001-2002).
140. See BEAVER, supra note 101, at 60-61.
141. The Civilization Act did not require that the agents of civilization be missionaries; it
did authorize the President to hire for this purpose "persons of good moral character," a
phrase understood to refer particularly to missionaries. Missionary societies were in fact the
only organizations engaged in Indian work at the time of the Act, so it seems to have been
written with them in mind, and upon the passage of the Act it was missionaries among
whom its directives were circulated. See id. at 68. As cited by Marshall in Worcester, the
Civilization Act provided:
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created what was termed the "Peace Policy," which advanced the same ends
even more aggressively, and was both administered and implemented by
Christian missionaries. 142 In all these initiatives, conversion to Christianity
and acceptance of the private ownership of land were intertwining aspects
of the civilization process. In 1818, this was floridly expressed by a
committee of the House of Representatives in support of the Civilization
Policy:
'Put into the hands of their children the primer and the hoe, and
they will naturally, in time, take hold of the plow; and, as their
minds become enlightened and expand, the Bible will be their
book, and they will grow in the habits of morality and industry,
that, for the purpose of providing against the further decline and final extinction
of the Indian tribes adjoining to the frontier settlements of the United States,
and for introducing among them the habits and arts of civilization, the president
of the United States shall be, and he is hereby authorized, in every case where
he shall judge improvement in the habits and condition of such Indians
practicable, and that the means of instruction can be introduced with their own
consent, to employ capable persons, of good moral character, to instruct them
in the mode of agriculture suited to their situation; and for teaching their
children in reading, writing and arithmetic; and for performing such other
duties as may be enjoined, according to such instructions and rules as the
president may give and prescribe for the regulation of their conduct in the
discharge of their duties.
Worcester, 31 U.S. at 557.
142. None of this is to deny that the motives of the missionaries, though constrained by
ethnocentrism, were humanitarian, or to gainsay their efforts to protect Native peoples from
the worst depredations of Euro-Americans. On the government's side, too, the support of
missions involved humanitarian as well as opportunistic motives. Missionaries were not
chosen for this work simply because of their religious credentials. It was expected that
missionaries would be people of moral integrity, and in particular that they would be
unlikely to have designs on Indian lands. See BEAVER, supra note 101, at 62-64.
Missionaries also were perceived as the most experienced and equipped candidates for work
with Indians. Well before the Revolutionary War, they had been working with Indians, and
within the next decades, many Christian denominations created the administrative apparatus
(e.g., missionary societies) to do the job. Moreover, conversion to Christianity was not as
coercive in the early republic as it became in the course of the nineteenth century. Henry
Knox, for example, actually forbade the proselytization of Indians who had not already
converted. For an excellent account of the missions up until the 1860s, see id. at 66.
Finally, it is important to note that not all government officials supported the civilization
policy. For example, Lewis Cass, architect of the Removal Policy, argued that Indians had
to be "reformed" before they could be "civilized." See JOHN R. WUNDER, "RETAINED BY THE
PEOPLE:" A HISTORY OF AMERICAN INDIANS AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 23 (1994).
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leave the chase to those whose minds are less cultivated, and
become useful members of society.'1 4 3
These government-supported conversion efforts, because they were
tacitly understood as Public Religion, did not raise Establishment concerns.
Indeed, the missions to Native Americans received their first government
sanction and support in the same period that constitutional principles of
non-establishment and religious liberty were being crafted. So it is
particularly strange to recall that resistance to government funding for
Christian ministers catalyzed the emergence of the religion clauses. In the
late 1770s, a bill for the support of Christian ministers was proposed to the
Virginia legislature, and was fiercely and famously opposed by Jefferson in
his "The Virginia Act for Establishing Religious Freedom" (1779) and then
by Madison in his "Memorial and Remonstrance" (1785).'" These
documents articulated the principles that Madison and Jefferson would later
craft into the religion clauses of the Constitution.14 5
When establishment issues were finally raised about the Indian missions,
the issue was not whether it was constitutionally permissible to force
Christianity on Indians. Instead, the establishment issue was pressed by
Euro-American Nativists, who denounced Catholicism and espoused
Protestantism as American Public Religion.146 After the wave of Catholic
143. BEAVER, supra note 101, at 67-68.
144. Jefferson, supra note 116; James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against
Religious Assessments, RELIGIOUs FREEDOM LIBR., UNIV. OF VA., http://religiousfreedom.
lib.virginia.edu/sacred/madison-m&r_1785.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2012).
145. For an excellent analysis of how religion clauses were (or, more accurately, were
not) applied to Indian missionaries, see Allison M. Dussias, Ghost Dance and Holy Ghost:
The Echoes of Nineteenth-Century Christianization Policy in Twentieth-Century Native
American Free Exercise Cases, 49 STAN. L. REv. 773 (1997).
146. These Nativist concerns reached the Supreme Court in Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210
U.S. 50 (1908). Quick Bear, a Protestant and a Sioux, was supported by the (Euro-
American) Indian Rights Association (IRA). See id. at 55. The IRA objected to use of
"government" funding (i.e., tribal trust and treaty funds that were managed by the federal
government) to support a Catholic school at the Rosebud Sioux Reservation in South
Dakota. Behind Quick Bear lay the congressional Act of June 7, 1897, ch. 3, 30 Stat. 62, 79,
which prohibited the use of government funds for the support of "sectarian schools." It was
this law that, according to Quick Bear and the IRA, had been violated by the use of tribal
funds to support Catholic missionary work on Indian land. Quick Bear, 210 U.S. at 52.
But the drive to deny funding to Catholic schools was hardly new when it arose in relation
to American Indians. In fact, it had been launched in the eastern United States during the
1870s by Protestant Nativists, who viewed "nonsectarian" Protestantism as a pillar of
national identity, and Catholicism as "sectarian" and un-American. See STEVEN K. GREEN,
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immigration to the Eastern United States, a battle arose over the use of the
(Protestant) King James Bible in public schools. In response, the Catholics
established their own schools using the (Catholic) Douay-Rheims Bible and
requested public funding for those schools.14 7  Protestant Nativists
countered by sharply distinguishing "non-sectarian" (read: Protestant) from
"sectarian" (read: Catholic) religion. "Non-sectarian" religion, Nativists
argued, was essential for the formation of citizens, and government not only
may, but also must, support it. "Sectarian" religion, on the other hand, must
be strictly "separated" from the state. 14 8
In the last decades of the nineteenth century, the struggle was repeated
farther west, in the context of Indian work. By that time, Catholic
missionaries had gained increasingly more government contracts for Indian
schools. Protestant Nativists, some of whom (e.g., Thomas Morgan) held
elevated roles in Indian affairs, argued that Catholics were unequal to the
task of "Americanizing" Indians. Nativists perceived Catholics not only as
un-American, but also as anti-American. Like Indians, Catholics were
thought to be prone to superstition, ritualism, irrationality, and a
collectivism that undermined their capacity to think and act as individual
THE BIBLE, THE SCHOOL, AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE CLASH THAT SHAPED MODERN
CHURCH-STATE DOCTRINE 179-224 (2012).
147. The Blaine Amendment (proposed first in 1874 and again in 1876) would have
applied the Establishment Clause to the states and prohibited the use of government funds
for "sectarian" religion. Although the Amendment failed at the federal level, "by 1890,
twenty-nine states had adopted constitutional language in keeping with the spirit of Blaine's
Amendment." See Ian Bartrum, The Political Origins of Secular Public Education: The
New York School Controversy, 1840-1842, 3 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 267, 329 (2008). On
the relationship between Protestant-Catholic tensions and school conflicts, see PHILIP
HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 287-334 (2002), and Bartrum, supra.
148. Because they viewed Protestantism as American and as nonsectarian, Nativists felt
that while the government must vigorously separate itself from Catholicism, Protestantism
both could and should be effectively established. An excellent illustration is this 1845
statement by the American Republican party:
Our sole objective is to form a barrier high and eternal as the Andes, which
shall forever separate the Church from the State. While we regard the religion
of the Bible as the only legitimate element of civilized society, and the single
basis of all good government, we are greatly opposed to the introduction of
sectarian dogmas into the science of our civil institutions, or the incorporation
of Church creeds into the political compact of our government. We believe that
the Holy Bible, without sectarian note or comment, to be a most proper and
necessary book, as well for our children as ourselves, and we are determined
that they shall not be deprived of it, either in or out of school.
HAMBURGER, supra note 137, at 228-29.
284 [Vol. 36
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol36/iss2/1
No. 2] TERRITORY, WILDERNESS, PROPERTY & RESERVATION 285
citizens. 4 9 From this conflict arose the first Supreme Court case bearing on
Native American religious liberty, Quick Bear v. Leupp. The decision
favored Native American religious liberty, but only in a very narrow sense.
The Court held that to deny government contracts to Catholic reservation
schools would unduly restrict the religious liberty of Native Americans. In
other words, religious liberty at this point guaranteed only the right of
Native peoples to choose among forms of Christianity; it did not extend to
the practice of Native religions themselves. 50
In fact, during the same period that Catholics gained this cramped
version of religious liberty for Native Americans, federal Indian policy
enacted its most draconian measures against Native American religions.
Strikingly, the suppression of Native religions went hand-in-hand with the
breakup of tribal territories and governments. In the Dawes Era (1887-
1934), also known as the Allotment and Assimilation Period, tribal lands
were allotted to individual Native American head of household.' 5' As a
consequence, about two-thirds of Indian lands ended up in the hands of
whites,'5 2 and many tribal governments were dissolved. 53  These land
policies were integrally linked to the second aim of the Dawes period - the
149. See FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN CRISIS: CHRISTIAN
REFORMERS AND THE INDIAN, 1865-1900, at 304-13 (1976).
150. Quick Bear lost, and the Supreme Court's reasoning was that to deny funding to
Catholics was to deny religious freedom. The Court held that "we cannot concede the
proposition that Indians cannot be allowed to use their own money to educate their children
in the schools of their own choice because the government is necessarily undenominational,
as it cannot make any law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof." Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50, 81-82 (1908).
151. PRUCHA, supra note 139, at 252-53. Curiously enough, this period also was
significant in regard to another land metaphor we have been tracing - wilderness - for it
was the period in which national parks were first created and designated as sacrosanct
"wilderness" areas. In an interesting book on this topic, Spence argues that wilderness now
began to mean land devoid of humans, who could enter it only as "visitors" and who also
were obligated to leave. These newly established wilderness areas became an important part
of Euro-American public religion, functioning as national shrines and pilgrimage sites.
Native Americans, however, had to be removed to preserve this newly defined "wilderness."
MARK DAVID SPENCE, DISPOSSESSING THE WILDERNESS: INDIAN REMOVAL AND THE MAKING
OF THE NATIONAL PARKS 3-4 (1999).
152. Scott A. Taylor, State Property Taxation of Tribal Fee Lands Located Within
Reservation Boundaries: Reconsidering County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands
of the Yakima Indian Nation and Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Cass County, 23
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 55, 68 (1998-1999).
153. See Padraic I. McCoy, The Land Must Hold the People: Native Modes of
Territoriality and Contemporary Tribal Justifications for Placing Land into Trust Through
25 C.F.R. Part 151, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 421, 448-49 (2002-2003).
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assimilation of Indians into Anglo-American culture.15 4 In the Dawes era,
assimilation took on especially aggressive aspects, including the forced
placement of Indian children into English-only boarding schools,'"' and the
criminalization of Native American ceremonies (the latter of which resulted
in the Wounded Knee massacre of 1898).156 Native Americans who
renounced (or appeared to renounce) their spiritual traditions and who
accepted private land allotments, could now finally become citizens' -
and so, for the first time, claim free exercise and other constitutional rights.
But in gaining those freedoms on Euro-American terms, Indians lost
religious and political freedom on their own terms.
Through allotment and other means, such as military service, most
Indians had gained citizenship individually by the early twentieth century.
But only in 1924 were Native Americans as a group made citizens of the
United States. 58 Only then, therefore, could Native Americans as such
claim constitutional protections equal to those of non-Native Americans.
"Religion" was particularly significant among those rights, since for Native
Americans it referred to integral life-ways having far-reaching implications
for the communal survival and wellbeing of tribes. The religious
persecution of the Dawes era was replaced during what was called the
Indian New Deal (1934-1954), with special protections for native spiritual
traditions.' 59 At that point, then, freedom of religion became available to
Native Americans through two different avenues. As individuals, they were
now entitled to the same citizenship rights as all other Americans. As a
group, they were now receiving special protections in the context of their
unique "ward-guardian" relationship with the federal government.
IV. The Native American Religious Freedom Cases
Not long after constitutional rights became applicable to Native
Americans, the religion clauses themselves sat up and drew breath. In 1940
154. Guzman, supra note 5, at 597 n.4.
155. See Bethany Ruth Berger, After Pocahontas: Indian Women and the Law, 1830 to
1934, 21 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 8 (1997).
156. See Randall Coyne, Defending the Despised: William Moser Kunstler, 20 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 257, 265-66 (1995-1996).
157. See John R. Wunder, "Merciless Indian Savages" and the Declaration of
Independence: Native Americans Translate the Ecunnaunuxulgee Document, 25 AM. INDIAN
L. REv. 65, 73-75 (2000-2001).
158. Id at 84.
159. See John D. Barton & Candace M. Barton, Jurisdiction of Ute Reservation Lands,
26 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 133, 141 (2001-2002); Fisher, supra note 130, at 11.
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and 1947 respectively, the Supreme Court incorporated the Free Exercise
and Establishment Clauses to the States. In 1947, in Everson v. Board of
Education, the "wall" metaphor resurfaced in Supreme Court dicta, and
with it, the implication that government should not merely disestablish, but
rigorously separate itself from religion. 160 Although the wall metaphor was
most closely bound to establishment jurisprudence, it signaled a strong
separationism that affected free exercise as well. While government,
imagined as "beyond the wall," was being scrubbed of religious bias, the
inverse also became true. Within the "wall," religion was to be more
scrupulously protected. Under the influence of Separationism, free exercise
began to enjoy its highest level of protection, culminating in the Sherbert
test of 1963.161 Under Sherbert, government could not place a "substantial
infringement" on religion unless it had a compelling interest in doing so.162
It was in this context that the three Native American free exercise cases
were to arrive and ultimately fail in the Supreme Court. The failures, I have
suggested, were telling in relation both to the Constitution's view of
religion and to the political standing of Native Americans. In these three
cases one can trace the gradual reduction of both the religion clauses and
the judicial response to Native Americans to matters of mere "equality."
Only one of these cases - the Lyng case of 1988 - was about land. All
three cases, however, challenged the territorial dominion of Euro-American
Public Religion, and in all three it was found that Native religious claims
could not be protected under the Separationist model of religion as private
property. These religious liberty cases are vivid evidence that the notions
of religion as private property and as public territory, although logically
contradictory, are politically effective for majoritarian interests against the
interests of Native Americans.
In Bowen v. Roy, Abenaki Indian Stephen Roy filed suit on behalf of his
daughter, Little Bird of the Snow, who was eligible for food stamps and
ADFC benefits. Federal law required that a social security number be
assigned to children receiving these benefits. But Roy, upon instruction by
an Abenaki chief, came to believe that use of a unique number would "rob"
his daughter's spirit. He refused to both secure a social security number for
his daughter and write it on the pertinent forms, whereupon Little Bird was
160. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1947). The wall of separation
metaphor had also appeared earlier in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878),
but it was after Everson v. Board of Education that the metaphor became, for a time,
canonical.
161. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
162. Id. at 406.
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denied benefits.16 ' Roy then brought suit against the government, arguing
that his free exercise had been violated and requesting an individual
religious exemption from the requirement that he write down a social
security number for his daughter. In addition, Roy issued a much broader
claim: he wanted to enjoin the government itself from using a social
security number for his daughter.'" As it turned out, the government
already had assigned the child a number.165 It was therefore theoretically
possible for the government to use the number for administrative purposes,
even without Roy's cooperation. Unfortunately for Roy, neither claim was
upheld by the Court in its plurality opinion. Only three justices supported
his request for an individual exemption.166
In contrast to the judicial view of Native Americans as "heathen," which
had characterized the legal treatment of Native religions until the 1930s, the
Roy Court accepted the plaintiff's beliefs as legitimately religious in nature.
But the critical point is that with this less normative and judgmental
definition of "religion" came a crabbed conception of free exercise.
Compared to the deferential standard earlier enunciated in Sherbert, Roy
ushered in a new legal regime in which the scope of free exercise
protections to which religion was constitutionally entitled suddenly shrank.
While agreeing that for Roy social security numbers were a genuinely
religious issue, Justice Burger insisted that for the government, they were
not. It was as if Roy were making "a sincere religious objection to the size
or color of the Government's filing cabinets."1 67 The Free Exercise Clause
"simply cannot be understood to require the Government to conduct its own
internal affairs in ways that comport with the religious beliefs of particular
citizens." 68
Obviously, this reasoning rested heavily on a Separationist model in
which religion is conceived as a narrowly delineated part of life, rather than
163. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 695-96 (1986).
164. Id
165. Id at 697.
166. Chief Justice Warren Burger wrote the plurality's decision in Roy. Only one Justice,
Bryon White, supported both Roy's broader request (that the government itself not use the
Social Security Number) and his narrower request for an individual exemption. See id at
733 (White, J., dissenting). Eight justices rejected Roy's broader request, and five of these
also rejected the narrower request. However, two of the justices who rejected the exemption
request did so because they thought the issue moot and/or not ripe. A minority opinion
supporting the exemption request was written by Justice O'Connor. See id. at 724-33
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
167. Id at 700 (plurality opinion).
168. Id. at 699.
288 [Vol. 36
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol36/iss2/1
No. 2] TERRITORY, WILDERNESS, PROPERTY & RESERVATION 289
the whole of a cultural world. The Court placed Roy's beliefs on one side
of the line and on the other, file cabinets, social security cabinets, and other
presumably secular things. In effect, the Court held that, for free exercise
purposes, religion is a matter of personal beliefs that cannot make public
truth claims or affect public reality. But Roy, like most religious believers,
was making an actual truth claim - that his daughter would be spiritually
harmed by the assignment to her of a social security number. So for him,
what the Court offered was meaningless - a right to believe that his
daughter would be harmed, but not the actual power to prevent the harm
from occurring.
While the Court's bewilderment at Roy's request is understandable, it
failed to acknowledge that government does "conduct its own internal
affairs in ways that comport with the religious beliefs of particular
citizens."'6 Indeed, government does so inevitably, because laws involve
beliefs and assumptions that inevitably bear on religion - including beliefs
about what is and is not "religious." So from Roy's perspective, the public
sphere was not religiously neutral. Instead, it embodied beliefs, and created
a reality, directly contrary to his. From the viewpoint of the majority, the
public sphere doesn't look like "Publick Religion." On the contrary, it
looks like reality, like truth. In judicial parlance, the public sphere seems
secular or neutral. Under this guise, Public Religion can determine public
reality, leaving private religion only a right to private belief.
This assumption that government is religiously neutral also explains
Chief Justice Burger's rejection of Roy's free exercise claim. Religious
exemptions, the Chief Justice argued, are not constitutionally required as
long as the law is not intended to discriminate against religion (is "facially
neutral" and uniformly applied).170 "[G]iven the diversity of beliefs in our
pluralistic society . . . some incidental neutral restraints on the free exercise
of religion are inescapable."' 7 ' Since any policy might create "an indirect
and incidental burden" on someone's religious belief, the Free Exercise
Clause does not protect someone from having to choose between "a public
benefit" (such as AFDC) and a religious belief. The right of free exercise,
Chief Justice Burger reasoned, means only that the law cannot directly
force the violation of a religious belief, or directly penalize religiously
mandated behavior.17 2 Unless intended "to discriminate against particular
169. Id.
170. Id. at 707.
171. Id. at712.
172. Id. at 706.
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religious beliefs or against religion in general" a law burdening religion
needed only to serve a legitimate (rather than compelling) interest.17 3
In this respect, the Roy case foreshadowed the downward trend noted
earlier. In the waning days of the Burger Court, and throughout the
Rehnquist years, free exercise shrinks from an affirmative freedom
(discrimination in favor of religion) to a mere protection against intentional,
negative discrimination. The Roy plurality read Sherbert as promising
something much less than special protections for religion. Instead, it
interpreted Sherbert only to mean that when a law or policy included "a
mechanism for individualized exemptions," it would have to consider
exemptions for religious as well as non-religious reasons.17 4 In other words,
government could not discriminate against religion. This was a far cry from
conferring upon religion any special constitutional status requiring
accommodation. As Justice O'Connor put it, Chief Justice Burger's low
standard of free exercise "relegate[d] a serious First Amendment value to
the barest level of minimal scrutiny that the Equal Protection Clause
already provides."7
The second Native American religious freedom case to reach the
Supreme Court also presented a conceptual challenge that the Separationist
model could not meet. In Lyng v. Northwest Cemetery Protective
Association, Native Americans objected on free exercise grounds to a road
(called the G-O road) that the Forest Service proposed to build in the
Chimney Rock area of Six Rivers National Forest. The G-O road would
have traversed an area known as the high country, sacred to the Tolowa,
Karak, and Yoruk tribes.17 6 Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor
concluded that the Native American respondents in Lyng were asking for
too much. More than a religious accommodation or exemption, Native
respondents were asking the government "to do its own thing
differently."' 77  Like Chief Justice Burger in Bowen v. Roy, Justice
173. Id. at 707-08.
174. Id. at 707.
175. Id. at 727.
176. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 442-43 (1988).
177. Id. at 453 ("The Constitution does not permit government to discriminate against
religions that treat particular physical sites as sacred, and a law prohibiting the Indian
respondents from visiting the Chimney Rock area would raise a different set of
constitutional questions. Whatever rights the Indians may have to the use of the area,
however, those rights do not divest the Government of its right to use what is, after all, its
land."). Justice O'Connor applied the same rule she had recommended in Bowen - a higher
standard than that what had actually prevailed in Chief Justice Burger's plurality opinion.
Beyond not criminalizing or penalizing religious expression, she argued, government should
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O'Connor read Sherbert in a manner unfavorable to the Native American's
free exercise claim. From Sherbert, she quoted this dictum: "[T]he Free
Exercise Clause is written in terms of what the government cannot do to the
individual, not in terms of what the individual can exact from the
government."178
But recall that Sherbert also decreed that government could place a
"substantial burden" on religious liberty only if government could
demonstrate a compelling interest in doing S0.179 Justice Brennan, in his
Lyng dissent, contended that the phrase, "substantial burden" referred to the
impact of government actions on religion.'80 Since the Court recognized
that the G-O road could effectively destroy these Native religions, Justice
Brennan contended that it was ludicrous to claim that their religion would
not be substantially burdened.'8 '
Justice O'Connor countered that the phrase "substantial burden" pertains
to the form, rather than the effect, of government action. The key word in
the Free Exercise Clause, she contended, is "prohibit."' 8 2  But while
government may not "prohibit" religion, it may inhibit some religious
expressions. In both Roy and Lyng, Justice O'Connor acknowledged,
government acted in ways that interfered with religious expression.
However, "[i]n neither case . . . would the affected individuals be coerced
by the Government's action into violating their religious beliefs; nor would
either governmental action penalize religious activity by denying any
person an equal share of the rights, benefits, and privileges enjoyed by other
citizens."l83 To demand more was tantamount to demanding that the
government actually helps people practice their religions.
Justice O'Connor did not acknowledge that government, in practice,
assists the religious practices of Euro-Christians, whose beliefs are already
embedded in public norms. Government, in other words, routinely
mistakes religious hegemony for religious neutrality. In Roy, government
actions reflected the belief that a social security number could not really
harm Little Bird. In Lyng, the Forest Service acted on the belief that land is
not even force a person to choose between following a religious belief and gaining a
government benefit (such as food stamps or AFDC). See id. at 449.
178. Id. at 451 (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 412 (1963) (Douglas, J.,
concurring)).
179. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403 (majority opinion).
180. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 467 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
181. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 451.
183. Id. at 449.
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not a living, sacred thing and therefore cannot be desecrated by a road.
Both the Lyng majority and the Roy plurality presumed, rather than
examined, the government's claim to religious neutrality.18 4  From that
standpoint, it seemed that only Native Americas, not the government, held
unverifiable "religious" beliefs about such matters as land and social
security numbers.
So, while the Lyng majority accorded Native Americans the right to
believe anything they want about land,18 1 those beliefs would not affect
legal realities. Otherwise, Justice O'Connor reasoned, free exercise would
entitle Native Americans to claim as much land as they believed was
sacred, and to exclude other religious claimants from the same land.18 6 In
Justice O'Connor's words, "No disrespect for these practices is implied
when one notes that such beliefs could easily require de facto beneficial
ownership of some rather spacious tracts of public property."'8 And again,
"Whatever rights the Indians may have to the use of the area . . . do not
divest the Government of its right to use what is, after all, its land." 88
Recalling the Marshall cases, however, it must be said that the high
country had not always been government property or even government
territory. Nor, indeed, had any of the lands now constituting the United
States. That history was strangely echoed in Justice O'Connor's distinction
between the (Native American) "use" of the land and the (government's)
"ownership" of it - terms Chief Justice Marshall had chiseled into law in
Johnson. Chief Justice Marshall's judicial act of dispossession, a century
and a half before Lyng, established Indian lands not only as government
territory but also as government property. And it had been accomplished
184. For example, in rejecting Justice Brennan's claim that the impact of the G-O road on
Indian religion should be considered, Justice O'Connor argued that such a judgment would
have attempted inappropriately to assess religious truth claims: "This Court cannot
determine the truth of the underlying beliefs that led to the religious objections here or in
Roy, and accordingly cannot weigh the adverse effects on the appellees in Roy and compare
them with the adverse effects on the Indian respondents." Id. at 449-50 (citation omitted).
185. The Court also affirmed that religious freedom includes the dimension of worship,
and therefore commended the Forest Service for attempting to preserve an area around sites
used for Native American rituals. However, these concessions on the Forest Service parts
were seen as voluntary accommodations, not as required by the Free Exercise clause. Id. at
454.
186. Id. at 452-53 ("Nothing in the principle for which they contend, however, would
distinguish this case from another lawsuit in which they (or similarly situated religious
objectors) might seek to exclude all human activity but their own from sacred areas of the
public lands.").
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through the adoption of a particular version of the Discovery Doctrine, the
religious roots of which Chief Justice Marshall had frankly explicated.
On both the Indian and the Euro-American side, then, fundamental
beliefs and values were at stake - beliefs and values concerning the
meaning and sacredness of land, the relationship of humans to land, and the
origins and moral legitimacy of various claims to land. As Justice Brennan
observed, the Lyng case was "yet another stress point in the longstanding
conflict between two disparate cultures - the dominant Western culture,
which views land in terms of ownership and use, and that of Native
Americans, in which concepts of private property are not only alien, but
contrary to a belief system that holds land sacred."' 8 9
The same point had been made by the Theodoratus Commission, the
group appointed by the United States Forest Service to study the Lyng case.
Even the presumptively secular views of land held by the Forest Service
and the Court had religious roots. The Theodoratus reported: "While
traditional Western religions view creation as the work of a deity 'who
institutes natural laws which then govern the operation of physical nature,'
tribal religions regard creation as an on-going process in which they are
morally and religiously obligated to participate."' 90
These opposing beliefs about land also imply opposing views of religion.
Unlike the metaphysical beliefs of Christianity, Native religions can be
undermined by actions that injure nature.' 9 ' As Justice Brennan wrote,
"Where dogma lies at the heart of Western religions, Native American faith
is inextricably bound to the use of land."' 9 2 And, again in contrast to
Christianity, Native religions are site-specific; they cannot be picked up and
taken somewhere else.'93 Neither religion nor land, on Native terms, is
fungible - they cannot be liquidated into cash or exchanged for other
goods.194
189. Id at 473 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
190. Id at 460 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing U.S. FEDERAL AGENCIES TASK FORCE,
AMERICAN INDIAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT REPORT 11 (1979) (Task Force Report)).
191. See Inter-American Comm'n on Human Rights, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples'
Rights over Their Ancestral Lands and Natural Resources: Norms and Jurisprudence of the
Inter-American Human Rights System, 35 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 263, 365 (2010-2011).
192. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 461-62 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 468 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("And of course respondents here do not even
have the option, however unattractive it might be, of migrating to more hospitable locales;
the site-specific nature of their belief system renders it non-transportable.").
194. Id. at 461 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Within this belief system, therefore, land is not
fungible.. . .").
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But religion, conceived in this way, cannot be contained in the
Separationist model. As the Theodoratus Report put it, religion is not a
discrete sphere for Native peoples, and separating the religious from the
cultural, social, or political aspects of life "forces Indian concepts into non-
Indian categories."' 95  We could go farther and say that the co-
extensiveness between religion and life-world for Native Americans
exposes that Euro-American polity is founded on a life-world of its own, a
life-world incompatible with Native worlds. This again signals the
contradiction between the two Euro-American models of religion. Although
the Constitution constructs religion as separate from the public world, it
also relies on a shared Public Religion, in which religious differences are
politically and economically insignificant.
As already noted, for Euro-Christians, this contradiction is beneficial. If
they are comfortable with the range of accommodations offered by the Free
Exercise Clause (and usually they are), it is because they are equally
comfortable with the norms that construct and govern the public sphere.
The situation of minority religions is just the opposite. For Native
Americans, religious beliefs center on land, and therefore defy the ideas of
territory and property upon which the constitutional order as a whole
rests.196
But on the Native side of these cases, too, contradictory models of
religion were also in play. The difference was that Native people, unlike
Euro-Americans, could not make these contradictions functional. By
appealing to the Free Exercise Clause, Native Americans invoked the
Separationist notion of religion as something unique and clearly
distinguishable from the secular. On the other hand, by claiming liberty to
enact a holistic life-world (e.g., to treat land itself as sacred), they were
appealing to a very different notion of religion, akin to Euro-American
Public Religion. In other words, Native Americans were simultaneously
requesting the accommodations available within the constitutional system,
and asking for a different system.
A final contradiction was at work in Lyng, and indeed in all three free
exercise cases. Native Americans came to the Court both as American
citizens demanding ordinary constitutional rights and as a legally unique
group. For the Lyng respondents, this created a particular problem. Insofar
as they appealed to free exercise rights shared with all other citizens, Native
195. Id. at 459 (citation omitted).
196. See ERIC MICHAEL MAZUR, THE AMERICANIZATION OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES:
CONFRONTING THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 94-121 (1999).
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claims upon sacred lands could be countered by non-Native American
religious claims to the same lands. For example, New Age rock climbers
have claimed a religious freedom to use Native American sacred sites on
the same occasions (e.g., the summer solstice) when Indian rituals are
performed.'97 From the moral and historical standpoints, of course, there is
an incommensurability between Native and non-Native claims. But from
the vantage point of the First Amendment, religious claims must be
commensurable. It does not matter, or should not matter, whether a religion
is ancient or new, or whether its practitioners are privileged or oppressed,
native or non-native.
There were, however, federal laws and regulations uniquely available to
Native American religious liberty by the time these cases were argued.
Most pertinent was the American Indian Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA)
of 1978.'9 Indians invoked AIRFA in the Roy case, and more forcefully in
Lyng, but in both cases, the Act proved ineffectual. First, AIRFA has no
enforcement provisions; it was simply a Joint Congressional Resolution,
rather than a proper statute. Moreover, it was unclear whether AIRFA
intended to provide anything special for Native Americans. Neither Chief
Justice Burger in Roy, nor Justice O'Connor in Lyng,'"9 thought that it did.
The resolution's sponsor, Senator Morris Udall, agreed, stating that AIFRA
would not "confer special religious rights on Indians," nor "change any
existing State or Federal law." 2 00 According to Senator Udall, the Joint
Resolution simply expressed a Congressional commitment (and a
"toothless" commitment at that) to guarantee that "the basic right of the
Indian people to exercise their traditional religious practices is not infringed
without a clear decision on the part of the Congress or the administrators
that such religious practices must yield to some higher consideration."2 0 1
On the other hand, AIRFA did call for special Congressional oversight of
Native American religious freedom.2 0 2 And the very fact that Congress can
create legislation pertaining uniquely to Native Americans results from the
unique political relationship between Indians and the federal government -
197. See LLOYD BURTON, WORSHIP AND WILDERNESS: CULTURE, RELIGION, AND LAW IN
THE MANAGEMENT OF PUBLIC LANDS AND RESOURCES 273-80 (2002).
198. Pub. L. No. 95-341, 92 Stat. 469 (codified as amended 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (2006)).
199. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 455. Justice Burger interpreted AIRFA minimally; to him it was
intended only to reiterate that Native Americans share with non-Natives a constitutional
right of Free Exercise. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 700 (1986).
200. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 455.
201. Id.
202. See id. at 471 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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the relationship that Chief Justice Marshall had so influentially described as
that between a ward and guardian.203 In any case, it was not the unique
implications of AIFRA for Native Americans, but their presumed equality
with other Americans, that was decisive in both Lyng and Roy. This
reduction to equality did not bode well for Native Americans.
In Employment Division of Oregon v. Smith, the two streams of this
narrative - the judicial treatment of Native Americans, and the judicial
treatment of religion - ran together and took a decisive turn. In Smith, not
only was the Native American Church denied protection, the high standard
of free exercise that had dominated the Court since the wall metaphor was
re-introduced in the 1940s came crashing down. As a result, religion lost
much of its uniqueness as a First Amendment category. Rather than
requiring that religion be treated in a distinctive way, free exercise came to
mean nearly the opposite: that people should neither suffer discrimination
nor enjoy unique privileges on account of religion. In parallel fashion,
Smith made clear that, for Native Americans, "equality" - that is, religious
liberty on the same footing as non-Native people - was an empty right.
After Smith, neither religion in general, nor Native American religion in
particular, would be constitutionally cordoned off from majoritarian
politics. 204 Rather than remaining "properties of peculiar value,"205 each
would be fully territorialized by a public ethos that, as I have argued,
amounts to a Public Religion.
Employment Division of Oregon v. Smith concerned two members of the
Native American Church (NAC), whose central ritual involves the ingestion
of peyote. Alfred Smith and Galen Black206 both worked for a private drug
rehabilitation agency in Oregon. They found no tension between their
sacramental use of peyote and their work against substance abuse, since in
the NAC, sacramental peyote is believed to cure drug and alcohol
addiction. But the rehabilitation agency thought otherwise, so Smith and
Black were fired. When they applied for unemployment compensation, the
state of Oregon denied their claims on grounds that they had been fired with
"good cause" - specifically, that they had broken a criminal law.207
203. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
204. See Emp't Div. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885-90 (1990).
205. See MADISON, supra note 120.
206. Id. at 874. Alfred Smith was a Klamath Indian; Galen Black was non-Native. See
CAROLYN N. LONG, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND INDIAN RIGHTS: THE CASE OF OREGON V. SwETH
ix (2000).
207. Ironically, however, neither Smith nor Black were prosecuted for these criminal
acts. Smith, 494 U.S. at 911 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Peyote use was illegal under Oregon's anti-drug law, and the state
208legislature had not chosen to exempt the sacramental use of peyote.
Smith and Black then brought suit against Oregon, arguing that its refusal
to create the religious exemption violated their free exercise rights.2 09
When the case arrived at the Supreme Court, the key question was whether
the federal Constitution required Oregon to create a religious exemption for
peyote use.210 If Oregon was not so required, then the freedom of the NAC
to practice its religion without criminal prosecution would rest on the will
of the majority culture as expressed in the legislative process.
For Native Americans in this as in other cases, the significance of
territory, property, and boundaries was more than metaphorical. Of first
and fundamental significance was the territorial jurisdiction of the federal
government and its claim to title over Indian lands. These claims, affirmed
in Johnson v. M'Intosh, provided some "excuse, if not justification," for the
fact that Native Americans had become subject to Euro-American law in
the first place.211 Closely related to the territorial claims of the federal
government were the jurisdictional claims that states have tried to assert
over Indian land and people. That was the conundrum that Chief Justice
Marshall attempted to resolve in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia. By defining
Indian territories as "domestic dependent nations" and Indian peoples as
"wards" and "pupils" of the federal government,212 he had granted the
federal government unique powers over Indian lands and Indian peoples. In
so doing, he had also hoped to severely limit the powers of states in regard
to Indian affairs.
Even in its own time, sadly, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia had not quieted
the jurisdictional claims of states. Despite Chief Justice Marshall's
federalist stance in that case and in the Worcester case which soon
followed, Georgia (thanks to the support of President Jackson) was able to
force the Cherokees out of what Georgia regarded as its territory.213 By the
time of the Smith case, the boundaries between federal, state, and tribal
jurisdictions over Indian lands and people had been drawn and redrawn
214
many times.21 But at the federal level, at least, Native American
208. Id. at 876 (majority opinion).
209. Id. at 874.
210. See id. at 888-89.
211. Johnson v. M'Intosb, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 589 (1823).
212. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
213. See Shockey, supra note 12, at 289.
214. The most significant intrusion of state power onto Indian lands was Public Law 280.
Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18
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sacramental peyote had definitely been exempted from the anti-drug statute
of 1970.215 Although Oregon's drug law was modeled on this federal law,
the state chose not to reproduce this exemption.2 16 In this sense, the Smith
case re-activated the old border conflict between federal and state
jurisdiction over Indians. And the Rehnquist Court, with its preference for
new federalism (i.e., states' rights) over the original conception of
federalism advanced by Chief Justice Marshall, would be more deferential
to the claims of states than Marshall had been.
Since the special status of Indians was unavailing so far as Oregon's
drug laws were concerned, the case brought by Smith and Black did not
hinge on whether Native Americans would be treated uniquely. Instead,
they simply asked that their religion, like those of all American citizens, be
protected from government intrusion. Unlike Roy and Lyng, which seemed
to demand that the government conduct its own business in a different
manner, Smith and Black asked only that they as peyote users be
217individually exempt from the law on grounds of free exercise. Indeed,
U.S.C. § 1162 (2006); 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2006)). Public
Law 280 significantly reduced the power of tribal courts by giving states jurisdiction over
most felonies and misdemeanors committed on reservations, with the exception of several
"major offenses," which (when committed by Native Americans on reservations) remain
under federal jurisdiction. Public Law 280 was mandatory in some states and voluntary (on
the states' part) in others. Although a number of states have retroceded their Public Law 280
jurisdiction, Native American reservations still remain subject to three sovereigns,
depending on the circumstances - tribal, state and federal. See generally Vanessa J.
Jimenez & Soo C. Song, Concurrent Tribal and State Jurisdiction Under Public Law 280,
47 AM. U. L. REv. 1627 (1998); John J Harte, Validity of a State Court's Exercise of
Concurrent Jurisdiction over Civil Actions Arising in Indian Country: Application of the
Indian Abstention Doctrine in State Court, 21 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 63 (1997). This tripartite
sovereignty was affirmed by the Rehnquist Court in Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico,
490 U.S. 163, 188 (1989). Public Law 280 also had some bearing on Employment Division
of Oregon v. Smith. Oregon was claiming that peyote religion is not entitled to Free
Exercise exemptions, and due to Public Law 280, the state arguably had jurisdiction on
Indian reservations. Respondents argued that by the logic of this position, the state would be
able to outlaw Peyote religion even on reservations, where Native religions and cultures are
promised federal protection. Brief for Respondents, Emp't Div. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872 (1990) (No. 88-1213), 1989 WL 1126850 at *41.
215. The federal peyote exemption first appeared in the Comprehensive Drug Abuse and
Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970). There, peyote was listed as a
Schedule I drug (highest potential for abuse) but an exemption was created for "the nondrug
use of peyote in bona fide religious ceremonies of the Native American Church[.]" 21
C.F.R. § 1307.31 (1971).
216. See 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31. Oregon has no similar law.
217. See Emp't Div. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882-83 (1990).
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from its formation in 1918, the Native American Church was designed
specifically to shape peyotism into a religion that would be entitled to free
exercise rights.2 18 As a result, the Native American Church conformed
much more closely than had Roy or Lyng to the idea of religion presumed
by the Founders. As practiced by the NAC, Peyotism was designed to be
portable, interior, morally conventional, and deeply influenced by
Christianity.2 19
While Smith did not hinge on whether Native Americans would be
treated uniquely by the legal system, it did hinge on whether religion would
be treated uniquely. It hinged, in other words, on whether religion would
be treated as a singular source of exemptions and accommodations, which
is precisely what the Free Exercise Clause textually requires. Remarkably,
the answer was "no." Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia opined that
religious practitioners were not entitled to exemptions from a "generally
applicable law," particularly a criminal law.220  As long as the law in
question was not created with the intention of discriminating against a
religious group, religious motives for criminal activity were no different
than any other motives. In fact, Justice Scalia argued, effective free
exercise claims had never been more than claims against religious
discrimination. In instances where the Free Exercise Clause seemed to
218. See John Rhodes, An American Tradition: The Religious Persecution of Native
Americans, 52 MONT. L. REv. 13, 38-39 (1991).
219. For an insiders' description of the Native American Church, see generally ONE
NATION UNDER GOD: THE TRIUMPH OF THE NATIVE AMERICAN CHURCH (Huston Smith &
Reuben Snake eds., 1996).
The conventionality of peyote religion (in relation to Euro-American norms) can best be
understood by comparison to prophetic revitalization movements among Native Americans,
of which the most famous (but far from the only) was the Ghost Dance. David Aberle, in an
important study of Native American peyotism, classified it among what he termed the
"redemptive" type of religious movement (aimed primarily at interior change) and
contrasted in with what he called the "transformative" type of religious movement (which
aims at large-scale social change). See DAVID F. ABERLE, THE PEYOTE RELIGION AMONG THE
NAVAJO 315-52 (1966). One political scientist, Carolyn Smith, in her study of Employment
Division of Oregon v. Smith, went so far as to effectively deny the name of religion to what
Aberle called the "transformative" movements. She refers to the Ghost Dance and similar
prophetic religions simply as "militant movements" and reserves the word "religion" for
Native American peyotism. See LONG, supra note 195, at 9. On Native American prophetic
religions, see generally Joel W. Martin, Before and Beyond the Sioux Ghost Dance: Native
American Prophetic Movements and the Study of Religion, 59 J. AM. ACAD. RELIGION 677
(1991), and Lee Irwin, Freedom, Law, and Prophecy: A Brief History of Native American
Religious Resistance, 21 AM. INDIAN Q. 35 (1997).
220. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884.
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confer more than that, he argued, this had occurred only because it was
combined with other constitutional rights, such as freedom of speech or
freedom of association.22 1
The Smith majority rejected a distinction that had been crucial in the Roy
and Lyng decisions - the distinction between an individual exemption and
a challenge to the legal order as a whole. In Smith, that difference no
longer was relevant. To make an individual exempt from a generally
applicable law was to undermine the law itself. This analytical move
caused an abandonment of the Sherbert standard, as most had understood
it.2 2 2 Under Sherbert, Justice Scalia observed, any government regulation
could "significantly burden" somebody's religious expression, and
therefore be subject to strict scrutiny. Application of the Sherbert test to
cases like Smith "would open the prospect of constitutionally required
religious exemptions from civic obligations of almost every conceivable
kind." 2 23 Even if a law could survive strict scrutiny - and Justice
O'Connor, defending the Sherbert standard, argued that Oregon's drug law
could - Justice Scalia's point was that the burden on the courts and
legislatures would be intolerable.224
Accommodation of religion, Justice Scalia argued, therefore should be
left largely to the political process, the only alternative being "a system in
which each conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the
social importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious
beliefs."2 25 As Justice O'Connor had pointed out in Roy, and as she did
again in her separate Smith opinion, the Free Exercise Clause virtually
221. Id. at 881. Justice Scalia characterized this combination of Free Exercise with other
constitutional rights a "hybrid situation." Id. at 882.
222. Justice Scalia argued that the Sherbert standard was of very limited applicability,
pertaining only to programs like unemployment insurance that include a mechanism for
case-by-case assessment. In his reading, Sherbert itself was basically a non-discrimination
provision; it meant that if a government program offered individualized exemptions or
accommodations, religious reasons for requesting those exemptions should not be treated
less favorably than other reasons. Note that in this reasoning, Justice Scalia reiterates and
cites part of Justice Burger's reasoning in Bowen v. Roy. See id. at 884.
223. Id. at 888.
224. See id. at 889 n.5 ("[Clourts would constantly be in the business of determining
whether the 'severe impact' of various laws on religious practice . . . or the 'constitutiona[l]
significan[ce]' of the 'burden on the specific plaintiffs' . . . suffices to permit us to confer an
exemption.").
225. Id. at 890.
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disappears in this interpretation, replaced either by other items in the Bill of
226Rights or by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Perhaps the most striking feature of this decision was that the Smith
majority turned on its head the assumptions of Roy and Lyng about what
constituted religious liberty. In the earlier cases, the Court had assumed
quite reasonably that the worst thing the government could do to a religious
practitioner was to criminalize a religious obligation. Freedom from
criminal prosecution was therefore the minimal standard of free exercise.
As Justice O'Connor put it, government does not have to help you follow
your religion, but, absent a compelling interest, it may not "prohibit" you
from following your religion.22 7
But the Smith majority, examining the question from the standpoint of
the ruling majority rather than the persecuted minority, drew precisely the
opposite conclusion: that the most unreasonable and indeed impossible
demand religious people could make on government was to be exempt from
criminal laws.2 28 Taking the Smith logic to the obvious next step, one
cannot help but raise a troubling question. If the government can criminally
prosecute you for following your religion, why could government not
inhibit religious expression in less coercive ways? And if so, what becomes
of free exercise?
The devastating implications of the Smith decision illuminate perfectly
the intractable contradiction at the heart of church-state jurisprudence.
Criminal laws, after all, presumably embody the norms that the majority
views as essential to the wellbeing of society. But religion in its
constitutional sense also embodies inviolable norms, what the Founders
226. Id. at 894 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Our free exercise cases have all concerned
generally applicable laws that had the effect of significantly burdening a religious practice.
If the First Amendment is to have any vitality, it ought not to be construed to cover only the
extreme and hypothetical situation in which a State directly targets a religious practice.").
Justice O'Connor also stated, "We have in any event recognized that the Free Exercise
Clause protects values distinct from those protected by the Equal Protection Clause. As the
language of the Clause itself makes clear, an individual's free exercise of religion is a
preferred constitutional activity." Id. at 901-02 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citation
omitted).
227. Id. at 898-99 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
228. Id at 885 (majority opinion). Consistent with her opinions in Bowen and Lyng,
Justice O'Connor objected strenuously to the Smith majority's acceptance of criminal
restrictions on Free Exercise, not however contending with the paradox discussed below. "A
neutral criminal law prohibiting conduct that a State may legitimately regulate is, if
anything, more burdensome than a neutral civil statute placing legitimate conditions on the
award of a state benefit." Id. at 888-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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understood to be the inviolable norms of conscience. From the standpoint
of individual citizens, norms of this type must not be codified as law or, if
so codified, must provide generously for conscientious dissent. From the
standpoint of the polity, however, the exact opposite must result: norms
with this sort of essential, inviolable quality should be enforced as law.
Until the mid-twentieth century, this contradiction was managed by what
I have called Public Religion, a set of hegemonic norms that were presumed
neutral because the values they uphold appeared to the majority to go
without saying. Public Religion usually was not perceived by the Court as
coercive, or indeed as "religion" at all. Consequently, it rarely drew First
Amendment scrutiny. At the same time, "religion" for constitutional
purposes could be articulated as a quite limited realm of exemptions,
accommodations, and government restraints. Under these circumstances,
free exercise did not threaten the power of the majority to legislate. Nor did
the Establishment Clause undermine majoritarian assumptions, such as the
propriety of devotional Bible use in public schools, 2 29 denying atheists the
right to hold public offices,23 0 or suppressing the "pagan" and
"superstitious" rituals of American Indians.
But by the late twentieth century, things had changed. Increasing
religious diversity, together with the rigorous application of the religion
clauses, had exposed the non-neutrality of these public norms. They could
no longer be assumed without explanation. As Justice O'Connor put it:
There is nothing talismanic about neutral laws of general
applicability or general criminal prohibitions, for laws neutral
toward religion can coerce a person to violate his religious
conscience or intrude upon his religious duties just as effectively
as laws aimed at religion.2 3'
Oregon's peyote laws illustrated this point vividly, for in the context of
the American and European colonial history before it, the suppression of
peyote was hardly religiously neutral. In fact, it often was a specifically
religious form of persecution in the sense that Euro-Christians viewed
peyotism as "heresy," "heathenism," or "superstition" and attempted to
suppress it for that reason. The first European records of peyotism in the
New World come from the Spanish Inquisition, which issued a decree
229. See generally Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
230. See generally Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
231. Smith, 494 U.S. at 901 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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against the practice in 1620.232 In the American republic, federally
supported missionaries played a central role in discouraging peyote religion
and in supporting state-level, anti-peyote laws.233
By the late nineteenth century, when peyotism took on a large-scale pan-
Indian movement,2 34 the period of missionary control had ended, and
ostensibly secularized agencies, such as the Bureau of Indian Affairs, were
in charge of such matters. But in 1883, in the context of its most extensive
effort to wipe out Native religions, the BIA prohibited peyotism,235 along
with "heathenish and barbaric" practices, such as the Sun Dance and the
Ghost Dance.23 6 In some states, peyote could be legally used by Euro-
Americans for medicinal purposes, while remaining illegal only for Native
Americans - in other words, illegal only when used for religious
purposes. 237
It was in response to this long and well-known history of religious
persecution that the Bureau of Indian Affairs began to protect peyotism and
other Indian religious practices in 1934, under the leadership of John
Collier.238 By this time, it was anthropologists rather than missionaries who
were the most influential Euro-American players in Indian affairs. And just
as the missionaries had objected to peyotism on religious grounds, so there
232. Sharon L. O'Brien, Freedom of Religion in Indian Country, 56 MONT. L. REv. 451,
458 (1995).
233. Ann E. Beeson, Comment, Dances With Justice: Peyotism in the Courts, 41 EMoRY
L.J. 1121, 1139 (1992).
234. See John Thomas Bannon, Jr., The Legality of the Religious Use of Peyote by the
Native American Church: A Commentary on the Free Exercise, Equal Protection, and
Establishment Issues Raised by the Peyote Way Church of God Case, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REv.
475, 477-78 (1997-1998).
235. Peyote was prohibited due to its inclusion in the class of prohibited "intoxicants,"
but it is fair to say that in the Dawes period, these prohibitions were part of a deliberate
effort to destroy traditional Native religion and culture. See OMER C. STEWART, PEYOTE
RELIGION: A HISTORY 128-47 (1987).
236. See Fisher, supra note 130, at 8-9.
237. For a description of the Inquisition's effort to suppress peyote beginning in 1620
and continuing through most of the 18th century, see STEWART, supra note 224, at 20-30.
When the U.S. government began its own campaign against peyote use, that campaign was
initially directed solely against Native Americans. For example, the first law criminalizing
the possession and sale of peyote, which was passed in the Oklahoma Territory in 1899, was
concerned solely with the transfer of peyote only to "allotted Indians." No such prohibition
was extended to non-Indians. In the same period, federal agents began to prohibit peyote
use on Indian reservations. See id. at 131.
238. See James Botsford & Walter B. Echo-Hawk, The Legal Tango: The Native
American Church v. the United States of America, in ONE NATION UNDER GOD, supra note
208, at 128.
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was often a religious dimension to the support for peyotists among their
new academic and professional advocates. Figures like John Collier and
ethnographer James Mooney were not only interested in protecting and
studying the religious practices of Native Americans, they were also
personally attracted to Native American religions.239
These were the historical antecedents of the peyote exemption in the
federal drug control law, which Oregon had deliberately excluded from its
own anti-drug legislation. In view of this history, it was astonishing that
the state could present its drug law as simply "neutral" with respect to
religion, and more astonishing still that the Supreme Court would accept
this characterization. But with the Smith decision, government neutrality
was no longer simply assumed; it was aggressively and counterfactually
asserted. By requiring only that laws not deliberately discriminate against a
religion, the government was effectively encouraged to deliberately forget
about minority religions, or in the case of Native Americans, to feign
ignorance about something it had known for a long time.
The Native American Church had shattered that illusion of neutrality by
demonstrating that government actions had directly prohibited a religious
practice. At that point, the judicial argument had to shift ground, arguing
that religious exemptions had become simply impracticable. As Justice
Scalia put it, the danger of anarchy "increases in direct proportion to the
society's diversity of religious beliefs, and its determination to coerce or
suppress none of them."240  Under those circumstances, and "precisely
because we value and protect that religious divergence," the polity "cannot
afford the luxury" of applying the highest standard of scrutiny to all
government actions that might burden somebody's religion.2 4 1  As the
Supreme Court's definition of religion becomes more capacious and less
239. John Collier, a social worker, found modem Euro-American life wanting and looked
to Native American traditions for spiritual renewal. In 1920, upon visiting Pueblo country
(which he dubbed "the Red Atlantis") he concluded that the Pueblo had "the fundamental
secret of human life," a medicine for his own "sick" times. See BERKHOFER, SUPRA NOTE
101, AT 179. Ethnographer James Mooney, who was instrumental in the founding of the
Native American Church, believed deeply in the spiritual value of peyotism and other
American Indian traditions, such as the Ghost Dance. According to his biographer, L.G.
Moses, Mooney participated in many peyote. For Mooney's role in the formation of the
Native American Church, see Jay C. Fikes, Appendix: A Brief History of the Native
American Church, in ONE NATION UNDER GOD, supra note 208, at 169. For Mooney's
involvement in peyotism, see L.G. MOSES, THE INDIAN MAN: A BIOGRAPHY OF JAMES
MOONEY 179-205 (1984) (especially page 188).
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normative, then, its standard for the free exercise of religion shrinks toward
the vanishing point.
It would not be accurate, however, to end our study of these cases with
the implication that their outcomes resulted only in injustice and were
motivated only by majoritarian insensitivity or plain bad will. Certainly,
these free exercise cases - like the Marshall cases before them - were
built on profound historical injustices to Indians, and certainly the decisions
in those cases helped legitimate and sometimes advance those injustices.
242But the story was never that simple, as Stuart Banner argues.
Nineteenth century Native Americans were more than victims in their
dealings with Euro-Americans. They attempted to negotiate the best deals
possible in constrained circumstances, and they appealed to rules of law
that were accepted by their adversaries. 243 As Banner also argues, Euro-
Americans did not simply take Indian lands by force, but typically used
their own legal and economic systems - albeit in opportunistic and
sometimes cynical ways - to acquire those lands.244 The same applies to
the free exercise cases. Native Americans in these cases simultaneously
invoked the legal system and challenged it. They both asked to be treated
differently than non-Native citizens and to be treated the same. This was
done not because of hypocrisy or poor logic, but rather to deploy all
possible strategies in the hope that one would work.
Similarly, the negative outcomes of these free exercise cases involved
more than injustice (although certainly there was plenty of injustice in the
history behind these cases) and faulty judicial reasoning (though there may
have been much of that as well). The profound contradictions inherent in
America's discourse of religion, which these cases brought so vividly to
light, are irresolvable in the existing conceptual frameworks. The Lyng
Court was correct, for example, to say that in theory, there was no limit to
how much public land might be considered sacred to Native Americans.
They were also right to note that non-Native Americans could make
conflicting religious claims upon the same lands. The Roy Court was right
to fear that administrative procedures could not possibly be set up in such a
way as to cohere with every possible religious belief system. And the Smith
Court was accurate to say that once religious diversity is fully recognized,
there is no way to limit or manage the possible range of free exercise.
242. BANNER, supra note 42, at 6.
243. ID. AT 49-84.
244. ID. AT 11-48.
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Moreover, religious diversity does indeed erode the Separationist notion
of religion, and with it, both of the religion clauses. As the category of
religion expands, it becomes more and more clear that anything can be a
religious issue - from social security numbers, to the use of hallucinogenic
drugs, to the building of roads. To these Native American examples we
could add headscarves, animal slaughter, the number and gender of persons
one can marry, the teaching of Darwinism, and any number of other issues.
And if anything can become a religious issue, then there is no bright line
between what is and what is not religion. In other words, religion is
amorphous and assumes a different role depending on the context and
culture in which it is practiced. Yet it is the very word, "religion," upon
which the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses depend.
V Concluding Reservations: Religion and the Ground of Government
In the aftermath of the Smith decision, free exercise exemptions to
generally applicable, facially neutral laws no longer are constitutionally
required.2 45 Instead, the more salient question became whether legislatures
may permit such exemptions without running afoul of the Establishment
Clause. Since Smith, the Supreme Court has been less occupied with free
exercise simpliciter than with cases "in the joints," concerning religious
exemptions which, while not compelled by the Free Exercise Clause, may
violate the Establishment Clause.246
For Native American religions, the decline of free exercise cases implies
that it is more promising to rely on their unique treaty and trust
relationships with the federal government than on constitutional rights
shared with non-natives. At the moment, Native American religious
freedoms (like other Native American rights) are more effectively sought
by dealing with Congress than with the judiciary. As Louis Fisher writes,
rights are better sought by legislating than by litigating.247
It is true, of course, that the trust ("guardian-ward") relationship has
entrained some extremely negative meanings and consequences for Native
245. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 ("But to say that a nondiscriminatory religious-practice
exemption is permitted, or even that it is desirable, is not to say that it is constitutionally
required, and that the appropriate occasions for its creation can be discerned by the courts.")
(emphasis added).
246. See generally Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S.
709 (2005).
247. See generally Fisher, supra note 130.
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people.248 On the positive side, however, the trust relationship enables the
federal legislature to create unique protections for Native religions and
cultures. And that is precisely what happened after the Smith decision.
Peyotism and other Native religious traditions have been placed under
federal protection by a series of laws, resolutions, and executive orders.24 9
But the trust relationship alone is insufficient because it forces Native
American's to rely on the goodwill of the federal government in
establishing their rights.250
Beyond being wards of the federal government, Indian nations must be
treated as sovereigns, and that sovereignty must be conceived far more
robustly than hitherto. This deeper question, the question of sovereignty,
can be addressed only through the other main aspect of Native
uniqueness - their treaty relationships with the federal government. It is
to the treaty aspect of Native uniqueness, therefore, that we will shortly
return.
Non-Native Americans, too, have found that since the Smith decision,
their religious liberties have been protected more energetically by Congress
than by the Court. In 1993, Congress passed the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA),2 5 1 which attempted to re-institute the Sherbert
248. See, e.g., Guzman, supra note 5, at 651-63; Benjamin W. Thompson, The De Facto
Termination of Alaska Native Sovereignty: An Anomaly in an Era of Self-Determination, 24
AM. INDIAN L. REv. 421, 425-27 (1999-2000).
249. See, e.g., American Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-344, sec. 2, § 3(b)(1), 108 Stat. 3125, 3125-26. The section states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the use, possession, or
transportation of peyote by an Indian for bona fide traditional ceremonial
purposes in connection with the practice of a traditional Indian religion is
lawful, and shall not be prohibited by the United States or any State. No Indian
shall be penalized or discriminated against on the basis of such use, possession
or transportation, including, but not limited to, denial of otherwise applicable
benefits under public assistance programs.
Id. Two acts of Congress have greatly extended the protection of Native American religions
and cultures: the Native American Graves and Repatriation Act of 1990 (NAGPRA), 25
U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013 (2006), and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
of 2000, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-i to 2000cc-5 (2006). Executive Order No. 13,007, 3 C.F.R.
196 (1997), referencing NAGPRA, also extended protection to Native American sacred
sites.
250. See Thompson, supra note 242, at 425 ("Despite the advantages, there are several
serious disadvantages to the trust relationship. First, federal control over trust lands and
resources necessarily prevents the tribes and its members from making decisions affecting
their future. Second, a degree of paternalism inheres in the federal trust responsibility,
which may influence federal action in a manner inconsistent with the tribes' wishes.").
251. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2006).
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standard for all federal and state laws.252 The Supreme Court in City of
Boerne v. Flores253 overturned RFRA as applied to states, on grounds that
the federal government, while it can regulate its own actions, cannot
interpret the substantive meaning of the Constitution.2 54 At the federal
level, then, RFRA remains good law, and has been upheld as such by the
Court.255 But from the judicial point of view, it sets a higher standard of
free exercise than is constitutionally required. Since the Boerne case, many
states have instituted RFRAs of their own.256 In short, where there is a high
standard of religious liberty in the United States today, it is due more to
legislatures than to courts.
But for non-natives as for Native Americans, religious liberty should not
rely on the legislative branch alone. To do is to supplant a guaranteed
freedom with a precarious concession. Moreover, "religion" is a matter of
origins - i.e., the basic assumptions, values, and worldview of a people.
As Marshall conceded in the Johnson case, our national origins were
created by violence and often have been maintained through domination.257
But, for better or worse, those origins are not "finished;" they are
continually re-read and re-enacted.
The religion clauses offer principles for doing so in a deliberative and
democratic manner, and the questions they raise are precisely of this
"original" or foundational sort. What exactly are the purposes and limits of
government? What is the range and meaning of personal liberty? Which
norms are so crucial to public life that they must be in some sense
"established," and which are so crucial to moral integrity that they must not
be established? What is the role of sub-political communities within the
polity? How much power can/must these communities have to envision
and enact distinct life-ways? These are among the most "original" or
fundamental of political questions. The religion clauses do not resolve
252. O'Brien, supra note 226, at 451.
253. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
254. Id. at 536.
255. See generally Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546
U.S. 418 (2006). This case applies RFRA as federal law in favor of a religious group that
made sacramental use of a substance (hoasca) containing a chemical whose use is prohibited
by federal law. Id.
256. As of 2010, according to Christopher Lund, 16 states had enacted RFRAs:
Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Rhode Island, Alabama, Arizona, South Carolina, Texas,
Idaho, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Missouri, Virginia, Utah and Tennessee. See
Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzalez: A Look at State RFRAs, 55 S.D. L.
REv. 466, 477 (2010).
257. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 583-84, 589 (1823).
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these questions, but they do force us to confront these questions, and they
provide constitutional principles and parameters with which to frame the
answers.
However, the religion clauses cannot function when religion is treated
simply as a suspect classification rather than as a topic bound by unique
constitutional principles. On the other hand, as the Native American cases
vividly illustrate, religion is a moving target. The list of religions grows
and changes over time, and even the religions on the list cannot easily agree
on what the word means. Nor is the line between the religious and the
secular fixed. Indeed, the line may not really exist, given that to define the
secular is a "religious" decision - in other words, a decision about what
does and doesn't comprise the sacred. To revitalize democratic deliberation
about religion, therefore, we do need to re-imagine religion. But to do so,
we need metaphors other than territory (with its implication of domination)
or property (with its implication of individual ownership). Returning to the
third Marshall case, Worcester v. Georgia, I will suggest that reservation is
such a metaphor.258
The word reservation comes from a judicial doctrine of treaty
interpretation that was called the "reserved rights doctrine., 25 9  This
doctrine was fully spelled out by the Court in the early twentieth century,2 60
but first laid down in Chief Justice Marshall's Worcester decision.2 6 1
Reservation referred to the lands retained by Native Americans and
within which they could exercise sovereignty.262 In time, however,
258. My turn to "reservation," both as a metaphor and as a legal concept, is much
indebted to Philip P. Frickey, supra note 65, and to Vine Deloria, Jr., Trouble in High
Places: Erosion of American Indian Rights to Religious Freedom in the United States, in
NATIVE AMERICAN CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOMs 353 (John R. Wunder ed., 1996).
259. Frickey, supra note 65, at 402.
260. See generally United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905); Winters v. United
States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
261. Frickey, supra note 65, at 401-02.
262. Interpreting the 1785 Treaty of Hopewell, which had established the Cherokee
reservation at issue in Worcester v. Georgia, Chief Justice Marshall contended that the
Cherokees, in agreeing to the Treaty, were only agreeing to conditions related to trade. He
stated:
Is it credible, that [the Cherokees] could have considered themselves as
surrendering to the United States, the right to dictate their future cessions, and
the terms on which they should be made; or to compel their submission to the
violence of disorderly and licentious intruders? It is equally inconceivable that
they could have supposed themselves, by a phrase thus slipped into an article,
on another and more interesting subject, to have divested themselves of the
right of self government on subjects not connected with trade.
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reservations became places in which Native peoples were virtually
incarcerated.263 To return to another familiar metaphor, we could say that
Native people ended up on the wrong side of the "wall" that separated the
reservation from the Euro-American polity. Native Americans, as Chief
Justice Marshall concluded in Worcester v. Georgia, would have
understood the land treaties as grants from themselves to the United States,
rather than the other way around. In other words, Indians would have
understood themselves as retaining everything they did not specifically
cede.2 6
But the Euro-American govemment (sometimes at the federal level, and
sometimes at the state level too) grew to perceive the entire continental
landmass as its own territory.265  Rather than understanding Native
Americans to retain everything that they had not specifically given away to
the government, the government preferred to imagine that Native people
had given away everything not specifically allocated to them.266 The
meaning of reservation, in other words, was turned inside out. For Indian
Nations, this shift of meaning was literally disastrous in terms of real
property. It meant the loss of nearly everything.267 On a spiritual level, the
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 518 (1832).
263. The virtual equivalency between reservation life and incarceration in the late
nineteenth century was noted ruefully by U.S. Court of Claims in 1898.
These Indians, indeed, in 1878 occupied an anomalous position, unknown to
the common or the civil law or to any system of municipal law. They were
neither citizens nor aliens; they were neither free persons nor slaves; they were
the wards of the nation, and yet, on a reservation under a military guard, were
little else than prisoners of war while war did not exist.
Conners v. United States, 33 Ct. Cl. 317, 323 (1898).
264. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 552-53.
265. See supra note 38 (discussing transformation of the Supremacy Clause during the
Continental Congress to imply federal jurisdiction over the entire continental landmass) and
supra note 203 (discussing the expansion over state jurisdictional claims over Indian
territories).
266. This was, of course, the position taken by Georgia in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S.
at 552-53. It was also the view of Marshall's colleagues Justices Johnson and Baldwin, who
had argued in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia that the Cherokees retained no sovereignty
whatsoever. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 20-50 (1831).
267. The more benign and principled theory of treaty interpreted adumbrated by Marshall
in Worcester v. Georgia was immediately rendered powerless by President Andrew Jackson,
who is famously reputed to have said "John Marshall has made his decision; now let him
enforce it." See WALTER R. ECHO-HAWK, IN THE COURTS OF THE CONQUEROR: THE TEN
WORST INDIAN LAW CASES EVER DECIDED 110 (2010). This disregard for treaties and for the
underlying principle of Native sovereignty enabled the Removal Policy and the loss of most
Indian lands east of the Mississippi River. On the government's disregard for treaties, see
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relationship of Native people to the land, and thus to the heart of their
religion, was severely injured.268
The facts of the case were as follows. Samuel Worcester, a white man,
had been arrested and convicted by the state of Georgia for having entered
Cherokee territory without a state permit and without having taken a
required oath of loyalty to the state. Georgia issued these charges pursuant
to the laws it had passed in 1828 and 1829, after gold was discovered in
Cherokee territory. Georgia claimed absolute territorial control over
Cherokee lands that lay within the state's external boundaries and attempted
to dissolve the Cherokee's own government so the state could force the
Cherokees from their lands.2 69 The underlying issue, then, was the same as
that raised by the Cherokees a year before, in their own suit, Cherokee
270Nation v. Georgia. Ironically, the injustice that Chief Justice Marshall
could not address on behalf of the Cherokees themselves (given, in his
view, their status as "domestic, dependent nations") was eagerly redressed
when the Worcester case gave him the opportunity.
Georgia contended that in treaties (primarily the Hopewell Treaty of
1785 and the Holston Treaty of 1791), the Cherokees had given away their
land, retaining only their "hunting grounds."27 1 Moreover, Georgia argued,
in agreeing to allow the federal government to manage "all their affairs,"
the Cherokees had surrendered their sovereignty.272 Worcester countered
with three arguments, one statutory and the other two constitutional. He
argued that Georgia, with the laws of 1828 and 1829, violated an 1802 act
of Congress that arrogated to the federal government alone the power to
regulate "trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes, and to preserve peace
on the frontiers."273 On the constitutional plane, Worcester pointed out that
the Constitution gives Congress, not the states, the power to regulate
generally VINE DELORIA, JR., BEHIND THE TRAIL OF BROKEN TREATIES: AN INDIAN
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1974). For the history of the Removal Period and
associated losses to Indian lands, see generally AMY H. STURGIS, THE TRAIL OF TEARS AND
INDIAN REMOVAL (2006).
268. For the spiritual damage inflicted by the loss of land, see KIDWELL ET AL., supra
note 23, at 129-48; DELORIA, GOD Is RED, supra note 23, at 291-92.
269. See Worcester, 31 U.S. at 537-42; Frickey, supra note 64, at 393; Sundquist, supra
note 71, at 240-42.
270. See Shockey, supra note 12, at 287.
271. See Carpenter, supra note 10, at 117-19.
272. See Worcester, 31 U.S. at 553-54.
273. Id. at 537-40.
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relations with Indians.274 Most importantly, Worcester pointed to the
sovereignty of the Cherokee Nation over its own territory, as implied by its
treaties' relationship with the federal government. 275
Public Religion played a central role for the plaintiff, since Samuel
Worcester was "a duly authorised missionary of the American Board of
Commissioners for Foreign Missions, under the authority of the president
of the United States."276 As his brief correctly observed, Worcester's
presence in Cherokee territory belonged to a longstanding tradition of
federally funded missions to the Indians.2 77 As noted, this policy had been
formalized through the Civilization Act of 1819, in which Congress created
a fund to support "persons of good character" (in effect, Christian
missionaries) to live with Indians and advance their level of
"civilization." 27 8 These missionaries would be under the direct authority of
the executive branch. Again, this was rationalized through the image of
wilderness. Native people were "sons of the forest" in need of benevolent
taming by Euro-Christians.279
Under the Civilization Policy, missionary and government aims with
respect to Indians were congruent. Like the missionaries, the federal
government believed that Native people needed moral training, and that
Christianization was obviously the best way to accomplish this. Like the
government, missionaries hoped that Christian conversion would pacify
Native Americans and thereby ensure the safety of Euro-Americans. Both
the government and the missionaries linked Christianity with Euro-
American cultural habits, in particular the private ownership and cultivation
of land.
274. Id. at 559 ("The correct exposition of this article is rendered unnecessary by the
adoption of our existing constitution. That instrument confers on congress the powers of war
and peace; of making treaties, and of regulating commerce with foreign nations, and among
the several states, and with the Indian tribes. These powers comprehend all that is required
for the regulation of our intercourse with the Indian[s].").
275. Id. ("The constitution, by declaring treaties ... to be the supreme law of the land,
has adopted and sanctioned the previous treaties with the Indian nations, and, consequently,
admits their rank among those powers who are capable of making treaties.").
276. Id. at 538.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 557.
279. See BEAVER, supra note 101, at 67-68. The image of wilderness appeared also in
Justice M'Lean's comments on the Civilization, in his concurring opinion. Worcester, 31
U.S. at 588 (M'Lean, J., concurring) ("The humane policy of the government towards these
children of the wilderness must afford pleasure to every benevolent feeling; and if the efforts
made have not proved as successful as was anticipated, still much has been done.").
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Given that the tribal relationship to land lies at the heart of Native
spirituality, this commodification of land also decimated tribal religion.
Politically, the ending of tribal land ownership entailed the disappearance
of Indian nations as such. All of this was intended by both the government
and the missionaries. To put it bluntly but accurately, the cultural death of
Native peoples was viewed as the condition for their physical survival.280
In the years since 1819, however, another federal policy was being
introduced - the removal of Eastern Indians to the areas west of the
Mississippi.2 8 1 Like the Civilization policy, the Removal Policy was
rationalized as a way of protecting and improving Indian life.28 2 Initially,
this was to be done through treaty agreements; ultimately (and in the case
of the Cherokees) it would be done by violent force.283 Georgia's conflict
with the Cherokees flared up in the context of this policy shift from
civilization to removal.2 84
Whatever humanitarian motives for removal may have been asserted, the
material interests of Euro-Americans in this new policy were plain to see. It
provided land for the ever-increasing white population to the East,
extension of Euro-American political control, and access to material
resources on Indian lands2 85 - for example, the gold of the Cherokees.
And while missionary work could be viewed as humane, forced removal
was transparently cruel. In fact, as R. Pierce Beaver reported, it was the
introduction of the Removal Policy that caused the first serious friction
280. M'Lean stated explicitly that both the civilization program and Indian sovereignty
were intended to be temporary:
The exercise of the power of self-government by the Indians, within a state, is
undoubtedly contemplated to be temporary. This is shown by the settled policy
of the government, in the extinguishment of their title, and especially by the
compact with the state of Georgia. It is a question, not of abstract right, but of
public policy. I do not mean to say, that the same moral rule which should
regulate the affairs of private life, should not be regarded by communities or
nations. But, a sound national policy does require that the Indian tribes within
our states should exchange their territories, upon equitable principles, or,
eventually, consent to become amalgamated in our political communities.
Worcester, 31 U.S. at 593 (M'Lean, J., concurring).
281. Jose Monsivais, A Glimmer of Hope: A Proposal to Keep the Indian Child Welfare
Act of 1978 Intact, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 1, 2 (1997).
282. See generally Jill Norgren, Protect of What Rights They Have: Original Principles
ofFederal Indian Law, 64 N.D. L. REv. 73, 96-97 (1988).
283. See id. at 96; Sundquist, supra note 71, at 241; William Bradford, "With a Very
Great Blame on Our Hearts": Reparations, Reconciliation, and an American Indian Plea
for Peace with Justice, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 1, 23 & n.98 (2002-2003).
284. See Carpenter, supra note 10, at 119; Sundquist, supra note 71, at 240-42.
285. See Berger, supra note 147, at 7.
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between the federal government and the missionaries, most notably Samuel
286Worcester. Nonetheless, Removal was ideologically consistent with the
assumption underlying the Civilization Policy - that Native American
cultures were destined to end.
Chief Justice Marshall supported the Civilization policy of which
Worcester was an agent, characterizing it as "an act for promoting those
humane designs of civilizing the neighbouring Indians, which had long
been cherished by the executive." 2 8 7  But he regarded Removal as
profoundly inhumane, as he'd made clear the year before in Cherokee
288Nation v. Georgia. In other words, Chief Justice Marshall regarded the
Removal Policy as inconsistent with the Civilization Policy, despite that
both policies ultimately aimed to bring an end to Native cultures. While the
Chief Justice anticipated the same outcome in the long term, in the shorter
term he understood civilization as the alternative to removal. If Indians
became civilized, he believed, they should not have to move. 2 89 And the
Cherokees, in fact, had become "civilized." As Chief Justice Marshall
pointed out, they had set up a constitutional government, taken up farming,
and many had converted to Christianity.2 90
Uncomfortably for the Chief Justice, however, Removal was also
consistent with the Discovery Doctrine as he had formulated it in Johnson.
In Johnson, recall, Chief Justice Marshall had claimed that "discovery"
gave the conquering nation the right to "extinguish [] Indian title,"29' and
this pre-emptive claim to land would become the foundation of the
286. According to Beaver, the Removal Policy created the first tension between
missionaries and the government, although most missionaries accepted the Removal Policy
and some (e.g., Baptist Isaac McCoy) actively collaborated with its adoption. See BEAVER,
supra note 101, at 85-121. However, Samuel Worcester was among the missionaries who
resisted the policy. But even Worcester was to change his mind, in view of events that
transpired after his case was won. In defiance of John Marshall's order, the federal
government made clear its resolve to remove the Cherokees by force and Georgia continued
to place white soldiers and miners in Cherokee territory. Faced with the physical threat of
forcible removal, and the moral threat of contact with badly behaving whites, the Cherokee
could not be safe in Georgia, Worcester sadly accepted the policy. For Worcester's and
other responses to the Removal Policy, see RONALD N. SATZ, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN
THE JACKSONIAN ERA 39-63 (1975) (especially page 55).
287. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 557 (1832).
288. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 15 (1831).
289. Referring to the Civilization Act, Marshall wrote: "This act furnishes strong
additional evidence of a settled purpose to fix the Indians in their country by giving them
security at home." Worcester, 31 U.S. at 557.
290. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 6.
291. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 587 (1823).
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Removal Policy too. Moreover, the Marshall of Johnson noted, albeit with
a tone of opprobrium, that the Discovery Doctrine was at root theological. It
was because Europeans were Christians that they could assert that political
and cultural conquest was actually in the interest of the land and its
inhabitants. 292 Although the claim to title that grew out of this theological
doctrine was "extravagant," the Marshall of Johnson had underlined that it
had in effect come true; it was now the very "law of the land." 29 3 In
Johnson, then, the law of the land was founded on Christianity, although
imposed by force alone.
Chief Justice Marshall's rejection of the Removal Policy amounted to a
change in his public theology, specifically an attempt to remediate its
originative violence. In Worcester, the Chief Justice again called the
European claim to title "extravagant." But now, rather than adding that this
extravagant claim was nonetheless the law of the land, he called it
"extravagant and absurd."29 4 In fact, the Marshall of Worcester claims that
the idea that Euro-American territory and property would cover the
landmass from east to west, including the lands of the Indians, "did not
enter the mind of any man." 2 95 This was an extraordinary claim, since in his
Johnson decision, the idea seemed not only to have entered Marshall's own
mind, but for a time settled there.296
In an unacknowledged but radical revision of his prior Discovery
Doctrine, Chief Justice Marshall now adopted a more lawful and limited
version, akin to that proposed by the Cherokees the year before. Discovery,
he stated, was an agreement that European nations had made with each
other, and they had made it only "because it was the interest of all."2 9 7 It
now only meant that the conquering nation held the exclusive right to
292. See id. at 572-73.
293. Id. at 591.
294. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 544 (emphasis added).
295. Id. at 544-45 ("The extravagant and absurd idea, that the feeble settlements made on
the sea coast, or the companies under whom they were made, acquired legitimate power by
them to govern the people, or occupy the lands from sea to sea, did not enter the mind of any
man.").
296. See, e.g., Johnson, 21 U.S. at 586 ("The ceded territory was occupied by numerous
and warlike tribes of Indians; but the exclusive right of the United States to extinguish their
title, and to grant the soil, has never, we believe, been doubted."). Frickey argues that there
may be less inconsistency than appears between Johnson v. M'1ntosh and Worcester because
in the earlier case, Marshall's primary concern was not with Native American claims to their
own lands, but with the narrower question of how non-Natives could purchase Indian lands.
See Frickey, supra note 66, at 389-90.
297. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 544.
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purchase the conquered lands from its inhabitants; but it "could not affect
the rights of those already in possession, either as aboriginal occupants, or
as occupants by virtue of a discovery made before the memory of man." 298
However, there remained an important element of force: Indian nations
could sell their land only to the conquering government. This one
constraint, "imposed by irresistible power," was "the single exception" to a
lawful relation between Indians and the federal government. 299
Once conquest was complete, a more lawful and less violent relationship
had to be established. This applied also to the Christianization process.
Although the Discovery Doctrine had forcibly assumed Christian ideology,
Chief Justice Marshall argued that in the present, post-conquest situation,
Christianity had to behave differently with Indians. In the present, he
argued, conversion to Christianity must be "accomplished by conciliatory
conduct and good example; not by extermination."300
The key shift in the Chief Justice's public theology was an implicit
theory of "reserved rights," which as I've suggested, bears both on Native
American rights and on the constitutional substance of religion. In respect
to land, Chief Justice Marshall traced the idea of reservation to the British
crown, which in 1769, proclaimed that any lands not specifically ceded by
Indians to the crown were to be understood as reserved for the Indians
themselves. 301  The Chief Justice applied the same theory to treaties
between the Indians and the federal government.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 559.
This principle, acknowledged by all Europeans, because it was the interest of
all to acknowledge it, gave to the nation making the discovery, as its inevitable
consequence, the sole right of acquiring the soil and of making settlements on
it. It was an exclusive principle which shut out the right of competition among
those who had agreed to it; not one which could annul the previous rights of
those who had not agreed to it. It regulated the right given by discovery among
the European discoverers; but could not affect the rights of those already in
possession, either as aboriginal occupants, or as occupants by virtue of a
discovery made before the memory of man. It gave the exclusive right to
purchase, but did not found that right on a denial of the right of the possessor to
sell.
Id. at 544.
300. Id. at 546.
301. Id. at 548 ("The proclamation issued by the king of Great Britain, in 1763, soon
after the ratification of the articles of peace, forbids the governors of any of the colonies to
grant warrants of survey, or pass patents upon any lands whatever, which, not having been
ceded to, or purchased by, us (the king), as aforesaid, are reserved to the said Indians, or any
of them. The proclamation proceeds: 'and we do further declare it to be our royal will and
pleasure, for the present, as aforesaid, to reserve, under our sovereignty, protection, and
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As Philip Frickey has shown, this involved a generous, even tortuous
interpretation of certain words, particularly "allocated" and "hunting
grounds," as these appeared in the treaty of Holston, article four.302 For the
Cherokees, Chief Justice Marshall contended, "hunting grounds" would
have been indistinguishable from land as such, since hunting was their
primary relationship to land. Therefore in retaining their "hunting
grounds," the Cherokees would not have understood themselves to be left
only with the right to "use" rather than to own the land in question. 303 And
where the treaty spoke of lands "allotted" to the Cherokees, the Cherokees
would not have understood this to imply that the federal government now
possessed everything not specifically retained by the Cherokees. Instead,
the Cherokees would have assumed precisely the opposite - that it was
they who retained the fullness of their territory and sovereignty, of which
they ceded a part to the U.S. government.
Chief Justice Marshall justified his generous interpretive strategy partly
with reference to the fact that the Cherokees were not literate and likely did
not pick up the nuances and risks of the treaty language.30 s Moreover, the
Chief Justice argued that treaties must never be read in a way that negated
the sovereignty of the weaker party. Citing Vattel, Marshall asserted this
principle as belonging to "the settled . .. law of nations." 306 Because Indian
dominion, for the use of the said Indians, all the lands and territories lying to the westward
of the sources of the rivers which fall into the sea, from the west and northwest as aforesaid:
and we do hereby strictly forbid, on pain of our displeasure, all our loving subjects from
making any purchases or settlements whatever, or taking possession of any of the lands
above reserved, without our special leave and license for that purpose first obtained."').
302. See Frickey, supra note 66, at 398-406.
303. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 553 ("So with respect to the words 'hunting grounds.'
Hunting was at that time the principal occupation of the Indians, and their land was more
used for that purpose than for any other. It could not, however, be supposed, that any
intention existed of restricting the full use of the lands they reserved.").
304. Id. at 552-53 ("It is reasonable to suppose, that the Indians, who could not write, and
most probably could not read, who certainly were not critical judges of our language, should
distinguish the word 'allotted' from the words 'marked out.' The actual subject of contract
was the dividing line between the two nations, and their attention may very well be supposed
to have been confined to that subject. When, in fact, they were ceding lands to the United
States, and describing the extent of their cession, it may very well be supposed that they
might not understand the term employed, as indicating that, instead of granting, they were
receiving lands.").
305. Id.
306. Id. at 560-61 ("The very fact of repeated treaties with them recognizes it; and the
settled doctrine of the law of nations is, that a weaker power does not surrender its
independence-its right to self government, by associating with a stronger, and taking its
protection. A weak state, in order to provide for its safety, may place itself under the
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nations were the weaker party (and also, no doubt, because of the federal
government's trust relationship with them), any ambiguities in the treaty
language must be interpreted in the best interests of the Indians.3 07 Philip
Frickey draws from this an additional, but persuasive conclusion: Marshall
handled Indian treaties as constitutive documents.30 8
Belonging to the "supreme law of the land," treaties between Indian
nations and the government were akin to the constitutional government
itself. Just as the federal Constitution could be understood as a sort of
treaty among sovereign states, each of which (according to the Tenth
Amendment) "reserved" every right and power that it did not specifically
cede, so the treaties between Indian Nations and the federal government
could be understood as an agreement among sovereigns, each of which
retained everything not specifically ceded to the other.3 09 Apart from the
imposed constraint of selling land only to the federal government, Chief
Justice Marshall wrote, Indian nations "had always been considered as
distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original natural
rights."31 o By declaring treaties to be the supreme law of the land, he
argued, the Constitution not only binds the federal government to the terms
of its Indian treaties but, more importantly, admits that Indian nations "rank
among those powers who are capable of making treaties."31 1 In regard to
protection of one more powerful, without stripping itself of the right of government, and
ceasing to be a state. Examples of this kind are not wanting in Europe. 'Tributary and
feudatory states,' says Vattel, 'do not thereby cease to be sovereign and independent states,
so long as self government and sovereign and independent authority are left in the
administration of the state.' At the present day, more than one state may be considered as
holding its right of self-government under the guarantee and protection of one or more
allies.").
307. See John Lentz, When Canons Go to War in Indian Country, Guess Who Wins?
Barrett v. United States: Tax Canons and Canons of Construction in the Federal Taxation of
American Indians, 35 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 211, 216 (2010-2011).
308. Frickey, supra note 66, at 408-11. This, he suggests, provides a "systematic and
attractive" way of interpreting Native American treaties. Id. at 406.
309. Frickey argues that Marshall recognized with some discomfort that at the point of
conquest, relations between the government and the Indians were founded on sheer force.
See id. at 408. However, Frickey argues, the Marshall of Worcester was attempting to
conceive a post-conquest arrangement in which relations with Indians, while still colonial,
would be founded on law. A treaty (in this case, the 1785 Treaty of Hopewell) between an
Indian Nation and the United States became "the piece of positive law that reflected the
constitutive relationship between two sovereigns." Id. By conceiving the treaty as a
constitutive document, Frickey argued, Marshall could interpret the Treaty of Hopewell to
accord with its "spirit" (the premise of sovereignty). Id. at 412.
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Georgia, this meant that its laws of 1828 and 1829, attempting to dissolve
the Cherokee nation, were unconstitutional, in violation of "the supreme
law of the land."3012
"Reservation," then, meant something more than a tract of land, however
broadly bounded. More than the literal "breadth" of geographical
sovereignty, reservation also implies the metaphorical "depth" of self-
sovereignty - whether of individuals, of states, or of nations - as the
foundation of political authority. For Indian nations, this self-sovereignty is
signaled by the constitutional status of treaties as the supreme law of the
land.313 For all citizens, native and non-native alike, the phrase "We the
People"314 signals the same point. These words, deliberately chosen by the
Framers in lieu of direct reference to God, 1  indicate that the ultimate
authority of the constitutional order - its "sacred ground" - is the power
of self-determination that inheres in each citizen. Political authority is not a
limited commodity rationed out by government. Instead, political authority
comes from the depthless wellspring of self-determination. This, in the
Constitution, appears to be the point of contact between law and the
absolute or infinite. It is self-sovereignty that is principally unlimited, and
government that is to be limited - indeed, absolutely limited.
Based on the history of these two trilogies of cases, it seems clear that
Native American rights are better protected through their unique status as
sovereign nations, than through minority protections. Religion, too, I've
argued is also better understood as a unique constitutional category than as
a "suspect categorization" that may not (for better or worse) be treated in a
distinctive manner. But what exactly is religion, in a constitutional sense?
312. Id. at 571 ("No one can deny, that the constitution of the United States is the
supreme law of the land; and consequently, no act of any state legislature, or of congress,
which is repugnant to it, can be of any validity."); id. at 561 ("The Cherokee nation, then, is
a distinct community occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in
which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no
right to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with
treaties, and with the acts of congress. The whole intercourse between the United States and
this nation, is, by our constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United States.").
313. Marshall's view of Indian treaties was affirmed in United States v. Winans, 198 U.S.
371 (1905), where the Court ruled that treaties were not grants of rights to Native Americans
from the government, but grants of rights from Native Americans to the government. Id. at
381.
314. U.S. CONsT. pmbl.
315. That the Founders' omission of reference to God was deliberate can be inferred
from the fact that it was a dramatic break with precedent (e.g., the 1781 Articles of
Confederation), argues Susan Jacoby. See SUSAN JACOBY, FREETHINKERS: A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN SECULARISM 28-29 (2004).
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Besides the arbitrary and changing list of religions, and beyond the artificial
distinction between the religious and the secular, how can religion be
meaningfully described for constitutional purposes?
This is not the place to offer a detailed answer to this question, but two
suggestions at least emerge from this issue. First, for constitutional
purposes, religion must be defined with respect to other constitutional
principles, rather than with respect to a list of religions or definitions of
religion extrinsic to the Constitution. Second, the principle of reserved
rights (rights "retained by the people") spelled out in the Ninth
Amendment,3 16 illuminates what is unique and distinctive about the religion
clauses. As the depthless "reservation" from which political order and
authority spring, religious liberty points to the ground beneath the
constitutional foundation. It is the site where the polity opens to the most
profound, ever-present, and ever-changing questions about its purposes,
scope, and legitimacy.
In an important sense, then, religious liberty is an extra-constitutional (or
perhaps meta-constitutional) issue. To a degree, all constitutional
principles partake of this quality, for unless they live primarily in the polity
as a whole (reaching the judiciary only at crisis point), they hardly live at
all. But with respect to the religion clauses, this extra-constitutional quality
implies something more. In contrast to any other constitutional principles,
this first item on the Bill of Rights points to the most profound questions
with which democratic deliberation must concern itself. "Religion," and
the constitutional questions it raises, pulls us back to our political origins, to
seek that which lies before and beyond law. Returning to this origin as a
place to dig for the questions, rather than a place to bury them, perhaps the
ground will speak to us again.
316. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Elsewhere, I have argued that religion for constitutional
purposes might be reconceived as an amalgam of freedom of conscience (for the framers,
identified with religion), freedom of speech/expression, and freedom of association (both
intimate and expressive association. The principle of reserved rights, emphasized in this
article, is not meant to supplant this proposed amalgam, but to indicate the sense in which
religious liberty is foundational and, in this sense, extra-constitutional. See generally Sands,
Property ofPeculiar Value, supra note 19.
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